Libia: guerra civile creata dalla Francia

25.07

Parigi allo scoperto dopo la morte di due militari nel Paese per mano di Daesh

Il ruolo della Francia nella catastrofe sociale, economica e umanitaria di uno dei Paesi africani più moderni e sviluppati, risale a prima dello scoppio della guerra civile nel 2011. Le email personalidella oggi candidato democratico alla Presidenza Hillary Clinton, evidenziavano, nel aprile 2011, il ruolo della Francia nel manipolare le decisioni del Parlamento Europeo e nel trasformare il sistema di difesa comune NATO in un Esercito di invasione per deporre un Governo riconosciuto dalle Nazioni Unite. Senza il supporto aereo della NATO, il Governo di Gheddafi sarebbe stato in grado di resistere alle forze ribelli creando una situazione simile al conflitto siriano con forti possibilità di vittoria.

L’intervento militare NATO non fu in difesa della popolazione libica ma degli interessi francesi minacciati. Due le priorità per l’Eliseo: distruggere il monopolio petrolifero della ENI in Libia e bloccare il progetto del Colonnello Gheddafi di sostituire la moneta coloniale FCFA (moneta comune imposta dalla Francia alle sue colonie africane) con una nuova moneta comune supportata da oro vero proveniente dalle riserve di Stato della Libia. Il FCFA è una moneta creata dalla Francia e imposta nel 1947 alle sue colonie africane. Trattasi di un sistema di totale controllo finanziario ad esclusivo vantaggio della Francia. Il FCFA impedisce ai Paesi africani sotto dominio francese una politica indipendente in termini finanziari, obbligandoli ancora oggi a pagare la ‘tassa coloniale’. Milioni di Euro che affluiscono alla Banca Centrale di Parigi. Anche le riserve di valuta pregiata dei Paesi africani sono obbligatoriamente custodite presso la Banca Centrale francese, che determina quantità e tempistiche di erogazione fondi ai Paesi legati al FCFA, moneta legata all’Euro e stampata a Parigi. Infine, il sistema FCFA permette che i prezzi delle materie prime siano stabiliti unicamente dagli operatori economici francesi.

«L’e-mail del Segretario di Stato Hillary Clinton dell’aprile 2011 identifica nel Presidente francese Nicholas Sarkozy il leader dell’attacco alla Libia basato su tre obiettivi: ottenere il controllo assoluto delle riserve petrolifere libiche, impedire il rafforzamento della influenza del Colonnello Gheddafi in Africa, rafforzare il dominio militare francese nell’Africa Francofona. Il pericolo maggiore che ha spinto il Governo Sarkozy ad intervenire a favore della ribellione fu il progetto di Gheddafi di creare una moneta africana che sostituisse il FCFA. Il nuovo sistema monetario (denominato Dinaro in Oro), se fosse stato attuato, avrebbe avuto credibilità internazionale in quanto basato sulle riserve aurifere libiche, all’epoca stimate a 143 tonnellate equivalenti ad oltre 7 miliardi di dollari. Il piano del Dinaro in Oro fu scoperto dai servizi segreti francesi all’inizio della rivolta e rappresentò il fattore decisivo per la decisione del Presidente Sarkozy di attaccare la Libia utilizzando la NATO. L’operazione di pura conquista imperiale fu camuffata da intervento umanitario, esagerando i crimini commessi dal regime e nascondendo quelli commessi dalla ribellione». Queste le rivelazioni di Sideny Blumenthal (consulente di Hillary) fatte lo scorso gennaio al ‘The Foreign Policy Journal‘.

Il sostegno militare francese alle milizie del Generale Haftar potrebbe rivelarsi un errore strategico dalle conseguenze internazionali incontrollabili. Il Generale Haftar é finanziato da Egitto, Arabia Saudita, Qatar e Turchia (alleati francesi nella guerra contro il Governo siriano). Gli intrecci tra gli islamisti libici e Haftar sono evidenti. L’attuale conflitto contro il DAESH non deve trarre in inganno. Molti analisti africani identificano il conflitto Haftar-DAESH come un scontro per l’egemonia del futuro Stato Islamico libico. Entrambi gli attori, finanziati dalle stesse potenze arabe, intendono far sorgere dalle ceneri della Libia un terribile Stato islamico radicale a pochi miglia di mare dall’Italia. L’attuale conflitto è stato iniziato dal Generale Haftar per imporsi come unica autorità islamica radicale nel Paese. I suoi discorsi apparentemente moderati e il ruolo assunto nella lotta contro il terrorismo islamico sarebbero dei stratagemmi per acquisire il supporto e i soldi dell’Occidente.

La politica francese in Libia è favorita da un storico alleato di Parigi che ha svolto il lavoro sporco in difesa degli interessi geo-strategici francesi nella Repubblica Democratica del Congo per sei anni, l’Inviato speciale ONU per la Libia, Martin Kobler, all’epoca al comando della missione militare ONU in Congo, MONUSCO. Kobler, durante il suo precedente mandato in Congo, ha clamorosamente fallito il compito di protezione della popolazione civile all’est che da 15 anni è ostaggio e schiava di 40 milizie armate ribelli, validi soci d’affari del Presidente Joseph Kabila. Kobler ha contribuito a soffocare ogni tentativo democratico politico e militare di abbattere il regime dittatoriale della Famiglia Kabila, e ha contribuito a rafforzare le Forze Democratiche di Liberazione del Rwanda – FDLR, permettendo a questa formazione terroristica (tramite complicità politiche e militari) di controllare il 42% del territorio congolese ad est e di diventare il principale attore politico e militare nella crisi burundese. Durante il mandato ONU di Kobler in Congo gli effettivi delle FDLR sono passati da 3.000 a 12.000 uomini ben armati e con ingenti mezzi finanziari grazie allo sfruttamento illegale di oro, coltan e diamanti del Congo in cui fin troppi ufficiali e civili ONU della MONUSCO sono stati coinvolti fin dal 2009. Ora Martin Kobler continua a garantire i suoi preziosi servizi a Parigi gestendo la crisi libica a favore degli interessi francesi.

Nel complicato conflitto libico, creato e alimentato dalle potenze occidentali, si assiste a un cinico disinteresse delle minoranze etniche, in special modo quella Berbera minacciata da sterminio totale. I Berberi sono una etnia indigena del Nord Africa (Libia compresa) che si considerano arabi. Il Colonnello Gheddafi per anni ha oppresso e sterminato i Berberi sia a eliminandoli fisicamente sia distruggendo la loro lingua, cultura e tradizioni. Nel caos libico i Berberi controllano la zona nord: Dejbl Nfousa e Zuara, creando il Consiglio Supremo dei Berberi della Libia, votato democraticamente da tutti i berberi libici. Il Consiglio non riconosce il Governo di Tobruk e il GNA di Tripoli ed è difeso da delle milizie berbere pesantemente armate.

Khalid Ait Khardi, attivista per i diritti umani, ricercatore e traduttore berbero originario del Marocco e membro della Associazione Culturale Berbera di Milano, spiega la situazione di questa minoranza etnica minacciata da estinzione sulle pagine di Geo Education.Org. «I Berberi di Libia chiedono uguaglianza tra tutti i libici, vogliono il riconoscimento della lingua berbera come lingua ufficiale, vogliono studiare la loro lingua nelle scuole e festeggiare le loro festività.  Molti Berberi di Zuara hanno raggiunto i “Gaddafa” a Sirte per combattere contro gli integralisti dell’ISIS e altri Berberi di Dejbl Nfousa aiutano e sostengono gli anziani e bambini fuggiti in Tripolitania dai massacri degli integralisti islamici. Tutti hanno notato la crescita dei gruppi estremisti islamici in certe zone, come Bengasi e la capitale libica, Tripoli, mentre questi non hanno trovato spazio nelle città e nelle zone abitate dai Berberi che gli estremisti islamici considerano infedeli in quanto la maggior parte delle regioni berbere professano la dottrina ibadita, una “terza via” tra sunniti e sciiti.  Per il popolo Berbero in Libia la situazione del dopo Gheddafi non è cambiata molto; non hanno firmato agli accordi in Marocco tra il Congresso Nazionale Generale e il Parlamento di Tobruk preferendo la neutralità e l’autonomia nell’attesa che vengano riconosciuti uguali diritti a tutte le popolazioni oggi rappresentate in Libia. In questo contesto va detto, infine, che la posizione della comunità Berbera nei confronti dall’attività dell’inviato del ONU Martin Kobler è decisamente critica non rinvenendo in essa un’equidistanza dalle parti in causa».

http://www.lindro.it/libia-guerra-civile-creata-dalla-francia/3/

Barghati says outside help needed to fight terrorism

23.07

By Ajnadin Mustafa.

France and other countries should be counted on to help Libya fight terrorism, Colonel Mahdi Al-Barghathi, the Government of National Accord’s defence minister said today.

Barghathi stated that those in the west of the country who had protested against France on Friday were exercising their right to demonstrate. But he added that the GNA had not authorised the presence of foreign intelligence agents. That prerogative he said, rested with the House of Representatives.

Nevertheless, he went on to insist that there was only one government in Libya and it was “stupid, ignorant and unpatriotic”  to try and deny this. Libya should be united to avoid a political, social, security and economic meltdown.

Barghathi added that the insurgents in Benghazi were terrorists who had links with Al-Qaeda. Foreign counter-terror forces were working against them. However, any other interference in Libya, any neocolonialism, would not be tolerated.

He deplored  the 14 murders in Benghazi and said they were a blemish on the city. He demanded that the authorities do everything to bring to justice the criminals responsible.

https://www.libyaherald.com/2016/07/23/barghati-says-outside-help-needed-to-fight-terrorism/

Libyan Scene and Turkish Coup: Deficiencies and Danger Zones

25.07

Internet

By: Senussi Bsaikri*

Observers are puzzled by the coup against the legislative

Senussi Bsaikri

authority in Turkey; they are left confused as how to assess the responses issued by intellectual and the educated elite.

We are witnessing a devastating war through a series of battles, each consisting of different artilleries and hold particular strategic value, intersecting nevertheless in being a subject of dispute between two-sided clashes.

As is the case in the Arab region, the Libyan war has spread between two parties, one disgruntled with the Justice and Development Party and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a strong supporter of their opponents. Some also consider him the head of the “obscurantist” movement against secular Turkey. The second party supports him and perceives him as an advocate for the Palestinian case and supportive of the Arab spring, in addition to him, promoting the idea of an “Islamic” Turkey.

What is worrying is that those who belong to either party use whatever arguments and evidence available to them with the intention of belittling their adversaries; their only aim is to embarrass their opponents and weaken their case. The sole motive is hatred, no place for logic or reason.

What I would like to emphasize in this article is that the Arab struggle generally and the Libyan correctly did not shift from a struggle with the ruling elite to a more community-based conflict as it may seem to the spectator. The previous authority succeeded in dividing societies over the past few decades by endorsing specific cities, tribes, regions and clans, using them for their objectives and purposes.

However, the community’s conflict has been manifested by the technical advancements and the development of media and telecommunications. The absence of an assertive authority has also played a huge role in further increasing the complexity of the situation.

The most noticeable feature of today’s conflicts is that they are out of control and filled with hatred and animosity. Thus the truth is lost with the loss of mind and lack of logic. You can hardly find an intellectual framework and an actual dialogue that addresses the cultural and social situation.

Indeed, some of what has been practiced by the Turkish Authorities in their campaign against insurrectionists is considered against the law and unquestionably falls under the general guidelines of human rights.

In contrast, many of the protesters against these violations were supporters of the grievous acts committed against protestors in Egypt, Erdogan never killed any demonstrators, he certainly did not burn any bodies as was confirmed by local and international organizations. Also, some of the groups that protested the crimes that took place in Egypt have kept silent regarding the infringement of detainee rights.

In conclusion, the greatest danger facing Libyans is the blind struggle fueled by corrupted minds and attitudes, disregarding the values and fundamental principles upon which the nation-building process would not succeed without. Tolerances, respecting different opinions, rejecting violence and excluding hatred from the political, cultural and social scene, are all principles the country will not rise without.

Simply, regional and tribal propensity, political intolerance and relying on them to justify criminal acts, is what Libya needs to eliminate, as long as such principles exist, the country will remain decapitated and continue to lose limbs.

*A Libyan Writer

http://libyaprospect.com/index.php/2016/07/25/libyan-scene-and-turkish-coup-deficiencies-and-danger-zones/

Jason Pack on Security in Libya

Who’s Who?: Libya’s Main Players – The Rise of ISIS

30.06

Since the ousting of dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya’s various political and armed factions have been fighting for control and power over the country’s post-revolution future, allowing extremist groups to take advantage of the ongoing chaos and security vacuum and rise up in place of a united government. The Islamic State of the Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) expansion in Libya in 2014 proved to be the most violent and worrisome, as the extremist group sought to establish a new Wilayah (governorate) in Libya, seeing the country as a model for its expansion outside of the Levant, attracting as many as 6000 fighters to the country.

How ISIS formed in Libya

Following the 2011 Libyan Revolution, which saw longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi killed in his hometown of Sirte, an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 Libyan revolutionary fighters made the journey to Syria to help rebel groups fight against forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War. In 2012, a large number of Libyan fighters joined the al-Battar Brigades in northern Syria and pledged their loyalty to the radical extremist group.

In the spring of 2014, around 300 fighters, accompanied by senior ISIS leaders, returned to Libya and formed the Libyan branch of ISIS in the eastern city of Derna. The newly formed branch of ISIS managed to attract several extremist armed groups in the city, including the Islamic Youth Shura Council and Ansar al-Sharia. Taking advantage of the lawlessness in Libya following the Civil War in 2014, ISIS’s affiliates in Derna  were able to take over most of the port city, declaring war on anyone who opposed them. The terrorist group rose to power in Derna following assassinations of members belonging to Derna’s security forces, judges, activists and politicians.

In November 2014, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi accepted Libya’s pledge of allegiance and announced that creation of three new governorates, Barqah in the east, Fezzan in the south, and Tripolitania in the west, to its growing caliphate. In addition, by December 2014, ISIS’s Libyan branch was ordered to stop sending fighters to Syria and instead focus on domestic attacks in Libya itself.

However, the extremist group’s hold on its new capital in Derna did not last long, and it faced immediate resistance from local Islamist militias, namely the Derna Mujahedeen Shura Council, who along with local allies were able to drive out the mainly foreign ISIS fighters out of the city in June 2015.

While forces in Derna were fighting to expel ISIS militants from their last remaining hideouts in the city in April, they also faced a number of attacks by General Khalifa Haftar’s army, who had besieged the coastal city as part of its Operation Dignity, which aimed to eradicate “terrorists” from eastern Libya. Surprisingly, instead of helping the Derna revolutionaries eradicate ISIS, Haftar’s militia did the opposite, likely aiding the extremists as they instead chose to target the very forces that were battling against them. In addition, despite Haftar’s tight siege on Derna, the last remaining ISIS militants were easily able to flee the city towards Sirte, facing no resistance as they passed through several cities controlled by Haftar’s forces. On their way west towards Sirte, the extremist group managed to attack the Oil Facilities Guards (PFG), an eastern militia who control and protect Libya’s eastern oil fields. The PFG has accused Haftar of making deals with ISIS to gain control of the oil fields and ports.

Nevertheless, ISIS militants were able to take advantage of the power struggle between Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), to establish a presence in different cities across Libya, including Benghazi, Tripoli, Sabratha, and Sirte.

Amid the escalating battles between General Khalifa Haftar’s Operation Dignity and the Tripoli based Libya Dawn fighters during the Civil War of 2014, ISIS managed to secure influence in several parts of Libya, mainly because their growing presence across the country did not seem like an immediate priority to Libya’s major warring factions.

Furthermore, Libya’s porous borders and strategic location at the crossroads between Europe, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, combined with the complete collapse of security, created the perfect conditions for both human and weapons traffickers to establish a lucrative black market in the country in which ISIS, among other groups in Libya, has profited from.

The Establishment of ISIS’s Stronghold in Sirte

In 2015, ISIS militants were able to establish a presence in the port city of Sirte, which is halfway along the coast between Tripoli and Benghazi, the two cities where most of the fighting between Libya’s armed groups has taken place. Sirte proved to be an ideal location for the extremist group to establish its Libyan capital due to its strategic position near Libya’s major oil fields, its port, and airbase.

What made Libya so attractive to ISIS is the country’s close proximity to Europe, which many western countries feared it could use a launching pad to threaten southern Europe, and its vast oil reserves.  However, the extremist group has only carried out minor attacks on oil facilities.

In Sirte, ISIS immediately began to fill the void of the government’s inability to provide security and control over the region, first launching an extensive propaganda campaign, imposing its particular brand of strict laws, and providing services to the residents in Sirte. In addition, foreign fighters from across North Africa have reportedly flocked to Sirte, rather than go all the way to Syria, to join the extremist group.

According to Human Rights Watch, ISIS inflicted severe hardship on the people of Sirte, including the withholding of food, medicine and cash from residents, and unlawfully executing up to 50 people by means of decapitation and shooting.

ISIS militants also committed a number of atrocities across Libya, including the brutal kidnappings and mass executions of Egyptian Copts, Ethiopians, and Eritreans. Countries such as Egypt and the United States responded to the extremist group’s growing brutality across Libya by carrying out a number of airstrikes targeting ISIS militants. Abu Nabil al-Anbari, the Iraqi born leader of ISIS’s branch in Libya, was killed by a US airstrike in November 2015 outside of Derna.

The Battle Against ISIS’s Stronghold in Sirte

A surprise suicide attack by ISIS militants, which killed five local security forces and wounded 12, at the Abu Grein and Al-Baghla checkpoints located between Misrata and Sirte on May 5 prompted the fledgling UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to form a joint military operations room in Misrata to oversee the campaign against ISIS.

Despite Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj’s numerous calls for all of Libya’s armed groups to unify in the fight against ISIS, the rogue General Khalifa Haftar refused to join a unified front under the command of the Presidential Council, deciding instead to declare his own military operation against the extremist group in May, leaving many to fear that separate offensives against ISIS in Sirte could lead to a confrontation between various military forces and plunge the country into another, more violent, civil war.

However, to the surprise of many, Haftar has yet to launch an attack against ISIS in Sirte, instead choosing to strengthen his influence in the east by going to war against his enemies in Derna and Benghazi and positioning his so-called “Libyan National Army” around several oilfields.

The unity government’s military forces are comprised of an alliance of Libyan armed groups that were formed during the Libyan Revolution and who have agreed to unite under its command to fight for their country. The Misrata brigades make up the bulk of the GNA’s forces, and have suffered the most casualties in the war against ISIS. The powerful western militia feels that they are bearing the brunt of a war effort that should be shared by all Libyans, and they remain cautious of the GNA’s ability to lead a national army, expressing their concern about its inability to control Haftar and his armed forces.

Only a month after launching the campaign against ISIS, the GNA has made significant advances against the terrorist group, recapturing Sirte’s power plant, air base, and port, while encircling ISIS militants in the center of the city. Albinyan Almarsous forces announced that a total victory against ISIS could take place in a matter of days.

The unity government’s second operations room in the area between Ajdabiya and Sirte saw the Petroleum Facilities Guard’s (PFG), who pledged their loyalty to the GNA, capture the towns of Ben Jawad, Nufilaya, and Hawara from ISIS militants in the east.

Up to that point, ISIS had not put up much resistance, however, the besieged terrorists are now retaliating with an increase in suicide bombings, mines, booby-trapped vehicles and snipers positioned on rooftops, in an attempt to retake the port and other areas.

A successful offensive against ISIS is significant as it may rally more Libyans to the GNA’s side, finally leading to political unity and national resolve.

However, the victory against ISIS would be short lived as long as the HoR, which is backed by Haftar, continues to delay giving its vote of confidence to the unity government.

Many ISIS fighters have reportedly fled to the south to regroup, and if Libyans fail to unite after the the extremist group’s defeat in Sirte, they may be able to again take advantage of a fractured country to carry out more terrorist attacks in other places.

https://www.libyangazette.net/2016/06/30/isiswhos-who-libyas-main-players-the-rise-of-isis/

Who’s Who? Libya’s Main Players – General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army

22.07

General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army

General Khalifa Haftar has been part of the Libyan political arena for more than four decades and continues to be a polarizing figure in Libya. The self-declared leader of the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) supporters consider him to be Libya’s “saviour,” while his critics on the other hand see him as another dictator, like Gaddafi, and an immediate barrier to political unity and national resolve.

Background

Hafter was born in 1943 in the eastern town of Ajadbiya. He took part in the coup against Libya’s King Idris, that thrust Muammar Gaddafi to power in 1969. Shortly after Haftar became a top military officer for Gaddafi.

In the 1980s, Gaddafi appointed Haftar as commander of the Libyan forces in Chad. In 1987, Haftar was captured during the Battle of Wadi Doum along with 600-700 of his men. Shortly after the ill-fated battle, Gaddafi denied that Libyan troops were in Chad, and subsequently disowned Hafter and the rest of the captives. This betrayal led Haftar to resent Gaddafi and turn against him.

The United States arranged for the release of Haftar and his men from Chad and offered him political asylum in Virginia, where he lived comfortably in the US for over 20 years near the CIA headquarters in Langley. While in exile, Haftar joined Libya’s opposition, and it is believed that he was working closely with the CIA to help overthrow Gaddafi.  Haftar maintained ties to anti-Gaddafi groups.

2011 Libyan Revolution and The Rise of the Libyan National Army

General Haftar returned to Libya in March 2011 at the onset of the Libyan uprising against Gaddafi, and immediately became a prominent figure after joining the rebellion to overthrow the former dictator.

Haftar’s self-proclaimed Libyan National Army, though appearing to be national institution, is little more than a gl

orified militia consisting of a large number of former members of the Libyan army who fought against Gaddafi in 2011, and members from his own Farjani tribe.

The post-revolution transitional government wanted to regulate Libya’s various militias by having them register under the Ministry of Defense. Haftar seized the opportunity to legitimize his militia and immediately registered his force through the ministry, cleverly calling it Libya’s “National Army.”

The majority of those who supported him felt threatened by the rise of Islamist forces who sought to extinguish any leftover traces of Gaddafi’s old regime. Haftar also gained the support of the Zintan brigades in west, who shared his anti-Islamist cause.

After the toppling of Gaddafi, Haftar disappeared from the scene until February 14, 2014 when he reappeared on television calling for a coup d’etat against the General National Congress (GNC), the then elected parliament in Tripoli.

However, his dramatic appeal to overthrow the government was not taken seriously.

Haftar has been compared to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi who as commander of the Egyptian army overthrew the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013. Haftar, who maintains close ties with Sisi, also has made it his mission to crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups in Libya.

Operation Dignity

General Khalifa Haftar was able to garner enough support from Arab nationalists, federalists, anti-Islamists, tribal forces, the Zintani brigades, and the armed forces within the LNA, to launch Operation Dignity on May 16, 2014 in the eastern city of Benghazi.

Haftar’s Operation Dignity, which was designed to eliminate Islamist factions from eastern Libya, particularly the Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi,  was broadening to encompass all islamist groups operating in Libya, including ISIS and marked the beginning of the Second Libyan Civil War.

Only two days after declaring the campaign, anti-Islamist forces aligned with Haftar surrounded the parliament building in Tripoli and called for the dissolution of the GNC. Haftar and his supporters had a problem with the GNC, which was comprised of Islamist political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, members of the Berber ethnic group, and former revolutionaries from the city of Misrata.

Expunging all Islamist groups from Libya proved to be more challenging than Haftar originally planned, and Operation Dignity dragged on for over two years. However, Haftar still received an avalanche of support from groups who blamed Islamists for a wave of assassinations and attacks on military and security officers.Following an election on June 25, 2014, the GNC lost power and was replaced by the House of representatives (HoR). 

The Libya Dawn militia alliance formed partly in response to Haftar’s Operation Dignity and partly due to the outcome of the election, which was rejected by GNC allies. This fueled the Libya Dawn militia to drive out the Dignity-aligned Zintani brigades from Tripoli in July 2014 after an intense battle at the Tripoli International Airport.

The HoR, which garnered international recognition, appointed Haftar as the commander of the LNA in March 2015. Members from the GNC denounced the former Gaddafi ally as a “war criminal” and said his promotion would further intensify a power struggle that threatened to tear the country apart.

Haftar’s Role in Post Revolutionary Libya

Haftar has frequently said that he has no interest in politics or power, however, he has repeatedly used his military power to influence politics. Haftar has expressed his disregard for the Libyan Dialogue, the United Nations, and the new unity government, which was established to aid in establishing national reconciliation and unite Libya’s various political and armed factions vying for power and control of the country since the ousting of former dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Western powers have been conflicted on their stance toward Haftar.  While western countries share many of the same enemies as Haftar, such as Islamist extremists, they fear that the rogue general could undermine Libya’s fragile post-revolution civilian institutions and act on his own interests.

In addition, the Libyan people are also divided between those in the east who see Haftar as Libya’s only hope for stability and those who view Haftar as a dictator-in waiting.  Haftar and his supporters want to have influence over Libya’s future and they aim to accomplish this by appearing to be the strongest force to contend with in the country.

Haftar’s allies in the HoR have repeatedly delayed upholding their end of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which was signed by all parties on December 17, 2015, and endorse the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). They want Article VIII removed from the LPA, which stipulates that the Presidency Council is to assume the function of the Supreme Commander of the Libyan army.

Hafter and his allies in the HoR want to ensure that he maintains control of Libya’s army under the new government. In particular, Haftar and his supporters desire control over the Defence Ministry.

In early May, Haftar announced an offensive against ISIS stronghold Sirte, despite warnings from Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj to hold off on any separate campaigns against ISIS, stressing that a divided front would only benefit the extremist group. This defiant move highlights Haftar’s sole intention is to gain political leverage and recognition for defeating ISIS and perhaps that is why he announced that his army was only 10 kilometers away from Tripoli last week – to distract the GNA’s armed forces from the battle against ISIS.

Nevertheless, Hafter has decided to hold off on attacking Sirte, and instead launched Operation Volcano in the coastal city of Derna in order to allegedly liberate the city from terrorism and Islamist control. Derna’s Shura Council has openly opposed Haftar, and in April claimed that they were able to drive out ISIS from the city without the help of Haftar’s militia. Many view Operation Volcano to be a repeat of Operation Dignity, whereby Haftar went after any group who opposed him or who he believed to be an Islamist threat.

Haftar remains to be a divisive figure in Libya and is pushing the country toward even more fragmentation. It is clear that if Haftar does not get the position he wants in the new GNA, he will continue to obstruct Libya from moving forward as a unified country. In addition, as long as he continues to receive foreign backing and support from countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, Haftar will less likely be compelled to relinquish his power.

https://www.libyangazette.net/2016/06/22/whos-who-libyas-main-players-general-khalifa-haftar-and-the-libyan-national-army/

Who’s Who? Libya’s Main Players – Defend Benghazi Brigade Vows to Take Down Haftar’s Forces

25.07

Background

On June 1, 2016 revolutionaries living in Benghazi declared the start of a defensive effort in support of the Shura Council and the Chamber of Ajdabiya, according to an official statement they issued.

They named themselves ‘Defend Benghazi Brigade’ (DBB) stressing that they do not belong to any party or any internal or external organization, but they are simply the sons of Libya. In their statement they called on supporters and fighters of General Haftar, commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army (LNA) associated with the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), to turn back to their original revolt intended to free Libya. They called out Haftar’s crimes and true agenda that have been exposed with time.

Furthermore, they confirmed that their point of reference is the Dar al-Ifta (Libya’s Council of Scholars) and expressed their thanks to those who support them in the country’s eastern, western and southern regions.

Leadership and Support

DBB is a force made up of soldiers and civilians turned freedom fighters during the 2011 uprising from the city of Benghazi and Ajdabiya. The DBB forces fought with the same commanders in the battles against former dictator Muammer Gaddafi in 2011 that they fight with today. Some of these commanders are Colonel Mustafa Al-Sharcassy, Ismail Al-Salaby, Ziad Bal’am, Ahmad Al-Tajouri, and Saadi Al-Nawafly.

The Brigade has the support of other brigades and military groups in western Libya.

In Ajdabiya the DBB allied with Adjabiya’s military operations centre, which is the new name of the Shura Council freedom fighters of Ajdabiya. Together the forces took control of the oil fields south of the city while in battle with Brigade 101 commanded by Lieutenant Muhammad Absat who is loyal to Khalifa Haftar.

Backed by Libya’s senior religious scholar Sadeq Al-Ghiryani, the former president of the General National Congress (GNC) in libya Nouri Abusahmain, and the Government of National Salvation serving under the GNC, the DBB and Adjabiya’s military operations centre’s objective is to rid Benghazi and Ajdabiya from Haftar and his forces for good.

What Inspired the Creation of This Brigade

For several months, while forces loyal to the Government of National Accord (GNA) have been fighting ISIS in the city of Sirte, in western Libya Haftar has decided to not support the GNA’s fight against ISIS and instead focused on seizing oil fields and attacking the Shura Council of Derna fighters who were instrumental in driving the ISIS from the city in the East.

The rogue general’s self-proclaimed “Libyan National Army” has been involved in armed conflicts in the eastern cities of Benghazi and Derna, despite announcing in early May that his forces would be the ones liberating Sirte from ISIS extremists.

Haftar has been investing his efforts in establishing full control of eastern Libya. It has been reported by civilian and military sources that militias loyal to Haftar have gained control of 14 oil fields in the Marada and Zilla basins. Haftar’s allied militias include fighters from Sudan and Gaddafi loyalists.

In May, Haftar launched Operation Volcano in Derna, which has been viewed as an extension of Operation Dignity, to allegedly liberate the city from the “terrorists” and “Islamists”. Operation Dignity was launched in May 2014 by Haftar to eradicate groups he has labeled as Islamists from Libya, who he considers to be terrorists and his enemies.

Derna’s Shura Council has openly opposed Haftar, and in April claimed that they were able to drive out ISIS from the city without his help. The opposition of Derna’s Shura Council was one of the reasons Haftar launched a war against the eastern city. Despite the fact that the Derna Shura Council has maintained that they are not affiliated with any terrorist group Haftar waged war against Derna is because he aims to establish full control in eastern Libya as political leverage.

Haftar has accused Derna’s Shura Council of being loyal to Al-Qaeda and Ansar Al Sharia and has placed Derna under siege to allegedly block Al Qaeda and Ansar Al Sharia’s movements in and out of the city.

Despite UN envoy Martin Kobler’s calls for a ceasefire in Benghazi, Haftar’s forces continue to engage in clashes with other armed groups in the city.

Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, has experienced some of the worst violence during the conflict. Frustration has been growing with Haftar’s war in the east that caused the deaths of civilians. Haftar has been accused of war crimes in Derna.

With the limited action by the GNA to take a stance, anti-Haftar brigades and militias have stepped up to take ownership of this indefinite war against Haftar. In a video message by DBB the force states that Haftar and his forces are criminals who destroyed many institutions, abused women, burned down homes and properties, killed religious leaders and also those who memorized the Quran in Benghazi and in neighbouring cities and towns. DBB claim that Haftar has done nothing but destroy and add more chaos, destabilization and lack of security to eastern Libya.

DBB, who claim to be independent of any political group or ideology, have vowed to fight Haftar and those who support him until the people of Benghazi are able to return to their homes and properties.

War on Haftar

The DBB has been able to gather forces in western Libya to fight under its name. The joint force was able to take control of Al-Jufrah military base, in the southern region of Libya, and set out towards the city of Ajdabiya.

DBB forces seized control of southern Ajdabiya on June 18 and declared it a military zone. After that DBB made its way toward Benghazi hoping to catch up to the Shura Council freedom fighters who are also fighting against Haftar.

DBB has been in ongoing clashes with Haftar forces who are trying to take over the town of Al-Maqroun in Libya’s eastern region.

Most recently, DBB forces were able to take down one of Haftar’s helicopters carrying French special forces.

https://www.libyangazette.net/2016/07/25/whos-who-libyas-main-players-defend-benghazi-brigade-vows-to-take-down-haftars-forces/

Obstacles to democratisation in Libya

25.07

Guma El-Gamaty

If one of the key driving motives for the Arab spring revolutions was to end tyranny and totalitarianism and replace it with a democratic system of government, then countries such as Libya, five years on from its 17th February revolution, still has a long way to go to achieve democratisation, due to both short and long-term obstacles.

Democratisation is essentially a process of transition from a non-democratic system of rule to a democratic one that is not only characterised by free elections but also the existence of a vibrant civil society, rule of law, separation of powers including an independent judiciary, and underpinned by state institutions and a democratic culture.

Immediately after the fall of a non-democratic regime there can be unstable periods of violence, a lack of security and even civil wars which obstruct a transition to democracy. 

Some of these obstacles can be common to a whole region - like the Middle East and North Africa - however, there are also intrinsic factors specific to each country, and Libya is no exception.

Key obstacles to democratisation in Libya include a lack of basic state and institution building, tribalism, weak or non-existent democratic culture, weak civil society and a "rentier" economic system that relies solely on collecting revenue from exporting natural resources such as oil and gas, and distributing it among the population. 

Lack of state and institution-building

Since 1969 when Gaddafi came to power through a military coup, Libya has ceased to have clear formal institutions and political structure; neither the decision-making process nor those who hold power and make decisions are easily identifiable and accountable.

Gaddafi was able to maintain power for such a long time through a combination of co-option and coercion, and his ability to manipulate informal power networks and tribal alliances. Libya after the demise of Gaddafi could be characterised as a stateless state with no state institutions, political parties, free press or civil society; pillars of a democratic system.

Is tribalism an obstacle?

The Libyan population is relatively small (just under six million) scattered geographically over a large country with diverse ethnicities such as Arab, Berber, Tuareg and Toubou. Libyan society also consists mostly of different tribes (over 100) with some tribes having strong local loyalties, wielding influence and aspiring to play a major role in their respective regions.

Different ethnic groups and tribes feel that they were marginalised during the Gaddafi era and now wish to reassert their right to a fairer distribution of power and wealth. A shift from a culture where loyalty is mainly to the tribe, ethnic group or region to a nationalist culture, in which loyalty is primarily to the country and its institutions where all citizens see themselves as equal under the rule of law, is an important prerequisite for a successful transition to democracy.

A deficit of democratic culture
A democratic culture is all about educating citizens to live by democratic values, norms and practices. It is about people seeing themselves as citizens with equal rights, enshrined in constitution and law, that they should demand, attain and protect and not merely be clients of a patron authoritarian ruler. 

Libyans who lived for 42 years under a totalitarian rule, where political parties, free press and independent civil society organisations were prohibited, have no experience or knowledge of the dynamics of how a democracy works. This has clearly created a deficit of democratic culture which constitutes an obstacle impeding transition to state institutions and democracy.

Rentier economy
Libya has an economy which is based on the natural resources of oil and gas (representing over 80 percent of GDP, and over 95 percent of export and government revenue) and is one of the least diversified economies in the region. 

Countries whose main source of revenue is derived from rents received from the selling of natural resources are called "rentier" states. Such states tend to be mere distributors of income to their citizens, who in turn become reliant on the state rather than contributors to state building, and Libya is a clear example of such a distributive state.

On the other hand, states that depend on extracting income from the economic activities of their citizens tend to have a vibrant productive economy, mainly characterised by being industrial and entrepreneurial. 

Diversifying the Libyan economy away from reliance on finite natural resources will facilitate wealth creation by the people from other productive infinite sustainable sources and reduce state patronage where the state is the main source of people's income. A diversified economy will harness institution development and allow the private sector to thrive, giving people the economic and political empowerment necessary to insist on their right to freedom and democracy. This in turn enhances the success of democratisation.

Islam and democracy
There are groups with extremist ideologies in Libya and across the Arab and Islamic world who advocate the notion that democracy is not compatible with Islam as they associate it with secular rule that separates religion from the state. These groups advocate the establishment of an "Islamic State" based on a distorted understanding of Islam and most resort to violence and terrorism to impose their discourse as seen by the rise of IS in a few countries including Libya. 

There is also a wealth of literature showing that there is no contradiction between Islam and democracy, and some of the largest Muslim countries in the world, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey, have enjoyed many years of democratic rule that resulted in higher levels of development and prosperity while preserving their Islamic identity, values and culture.

This proves that states can become democratic without being essentially secular, and it is crucial that those extreme groups opposing democracy must not be allowed to become an obstacle to democratisation in Libya.

Finally, Libya today is effectively a country that has no state institutions and is considered largely to be a failed state being torn apart by civil war between factions fighting for power and wealth. The urgent priority is to stop the violence and stabilise the country so that a national consensus can be achieved between the various factions, through a new social contract being a permanent constitution. 

Only with stability can the inherent structural obstacles to democratisation be addressed with a clear strategic vision for the country and a roadmap to achieve such a vision. Libya needs to begin by laying the foundations and build the basic structures of a state, and then address the other challenges on the road to democratisation.        

Guma El-Gamaty is a Libyan academic and politician who heads the Taghyeer Party in Libya and a member of the UN-backed Libyan political dialogue process. Follow him on Twitter:@Guma_el_gamaty

https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/7/25/obstacles-to-democratisation-in-libya?