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Es mostren els missatges amb l'etiqueta de comentaris GNA. Mostrar tots els missatges
Es mostren els missatges amb l'etiqueta de comentaris GNA. Mostrar tots els missatges

dissabte, 15 d’octubre del 2016

GNC and HoR to announce unity government

14.10

The former head of the National Salvation Government, in Tripoli, Khalifa Al-Ghuwel, and some members of the General National Congress (GNC), including the deputy head, Awad Abdul-Qader, as well as security officers convened, Friday evening, in Tripoli.
The meeting was held in the headquarter of the GNC in hospitality palaces in Tripoli, to agree on forming a national unity government under the leadership of Mohamed Boker.
According to close source in Tripoli, the sides of the agreement would include the head of the House of Representatives (HoR), Ageela Saleh, Khalifa Al-Ghuwel, the head of the GNC, the head of the Interim Government, Abdulla Al-Thinni, and Nuri Abusahmain. The agreement would be provided to the HoR to endorse it.
The source said that the two deputies of Boker would be Al-Ghuwel and Al-Thinni. The proposed government will start working in all of the areas in Libya. The meeting is expected to announce a statement, Sunday night.
The Presidential Council (PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA) hasn’t commented on the matter.

dimarts, 16 d’agost del 2016

A New Conflict in the East? Jadhran, Haftar, and the Battles over Benghazi, Tripoli, and Sirte

15.08

Paradoxically, the moment of the GNA’s approach closer towards victory against IS in Sirte is also a moment of a key defeat in its legitimacy. The political process in Libya remains derailed, and the UN-mediated Government of National Accord continues to lose legitimacy despite the successes achieved against IS in Sirte in its name. This observation was recognised by the UN envoy Martin Kobler in a recent interview, saying that popular support for the GNA is crumbling with much of the early support for the GNA evaporating due to worsening economic and security woes. What Kobler didn’t mention is that it is largely his failed implemenation of Leon’s flawed plan which has gotten us towards this point.  Kobler has shown a German dogmatism for sticking towards the letter of the law of the LPA without understand that it was meant to bring Libya’s key power blocs on board which it has failed to do.
A War between the LNA and the PFG in Zeuitina remains a high risk as the LNA is trying to bleed away support from Jadhran and undermine GNA influence in the East.
Politically the GNA is unlikely to receive any significant boost in legitimacy or governance effectiveness until a total victory is achieved by Banyan Marsus-affiliated Misratan forces in Sirte. However, this may make or break the GNA, as pro- and anti-GNA factions (especially hard-line Islamists) begin to jostle already in the capital to position themselves to take advantage of the outcome.
After Sirte is declared liberated, serious rifts within GNA-affiliated militias are highly likely, between those supporting a full attack against Haftar, and those wishing to oust Islamist militias from Tripoli. Although it ought to be a boost for the GNA to liberate Sirte, it is likely that the victorious militias will defy GNA rulings and expose the fact that the GNA is not actually a unity of anything.

THE ANTI-ISIS COALITION

09.08

A shared military front has not materialized and is unlikely to materialize, because ISIS’s opponents have never made a coherent political coalition against it. At the time of writing (early August 2016), divisions between Haftar’s LNA, the GNA’s Banyan Marsus, and Ibrahim Jadhran’s Petroleum Facilities Gaurds have never been greater.
Conflict between the LNA and Jadhran’s PFG is imminent in the coming days and weeks, especially at Zeuitina. However, since 3 August, the LNA’s (153) Desert forces led by Col. Muftah Shagluf has been mobilising forces to positions in Al Shurb, 10 km east of Zeuitina port. The move has provoked a strong reaction from the PFG, whose spokesperson Ali Al-Hassi threatened that any attack by the LNA ‘gangs’ will be met with decisive forces, and held the LNA accountable for any damages to the port or oil facilities in Zeuitina. If war does break out between the PFG and the LNA at/near Zeuitina, impacts on the larger political process will be extremely negative, and attempts to renormalize oil exports via Jadhran are likely to collapse.

dilluns, 25 de juliol del 2016

Barghati says outside help needed to fight terrorism

23.07

By Ajnadin Mustafa.

France and other countries should be counted on to help Libya fight terrorism, Colonel Mahdi Al-Barghathi, the Government of National Accord’s defence minister said today.
Barghathi stated that those in the west of the country who had protested against France on Friday were exercising their right to demonstrate. But he added that the GNA had not authorised the presence of foreign intelligence agents. That prerogative he said, rested with the House of Representatives.
Nevertheless, he went on to insist that there was only one government in Libya and it was “stupid, ignorant and unpatriotic”  to try and deny this. Libya should be united to avoid a political, social, security and economic meltdown.
Barghathi added that the insurgents in Benghazi were terrorists who had links with Al-Qaeda. Foreign counter-terror forces were working against them. However, any other interference in Libya, any neocolonialism, would not be tolerated.
He deplored  the 14 murders in Benghazi and said they were a blemish on the city. He demanded that the authorities do everything to bring to justice the criminals responsible.

UN’s Libya Government of National Accord: Refusing to learn from past experience

21.12.2015

The recently-signed agreement between sections from Libya’s warring factions will likely have little impact as most Libyan political players and militia groups oppose it, and because local initiatives and views were ignored during its conceptualisation.  The deal could increase fragmentation in the already gridlocked Libyan political situation, and provide more space for the growth of the Islamic state group (IS). Further, foreign intervention, under the guise of supporting the new ‘Government of National Accord’ (GNA), is becoming an increasingly distinct possibility, and was key in informing the international community’s support for the deal.

The agreement, signed in the Moroccan resort of Skheirat, ends a year-long negotiation process. The negotiations followed the reconvening of the General National Congress(GNC) in Libya in August 2014 in opposition to the internationally-recognised House of Representatives (HoR) based in the eastern city of Tobruk. The deal envisages the creation of a seventeen-member government, led by the little known Faez Serraj as prime minister, and deputies representing the provinces of Fezzan, Tripoli and Benghazi, who will be based in Tripoli. The internationally recognised House of Representatives (HoR) will play a legislative role, while the GNC will play an advisory role. Only members from both institutions who had signed the deal will, however, be regarded as being members of the two bodies.

Initially a bottom-up process which sought to incorporate civil society and lower level political actors such as mayors and town councillors into a process of finding solutions, the ‘negotiations’ have become a diktat from foreign powers. Diplomats have threatened sanctions for ‘spoilers’, refused to recognise the results of internal negotiations between the GNC and HoR, and stated that the agreement is unalterable. Further, the credibility of the UN has been tarnished by its partiality in the negotiations process. At the core of this heavy-handed attitude is the fears of foreign powers, particularly the USA and European Union, of migration and the growth of IS. Libya is viewed as a transit hub for African migrants seeking to enter the EU through Malta, a fear amplified by IS’s consolidation in the port city of Sirte. Western states regard Libya as a growing alternate IS base, and thus see intervention as inevitable. Already US and French aircraft have carried out operationsin Libya, and Britain and Italy are likely to deploy ground troops in the country. These states therefore seek the formation of a Libyan government which will sanction and coordinate such intervention. It is expected a UN resolutionwill soon be passed, declaring the new entity as the only recognised Libyan government.

The agreement has therefore been criticised by the leaders of both the GNC and HoR as a foreign imposition. Less than half of the members of both institutions (eighty of 180 HoR members, and fifty of 136 GNC members) havesigned the agreement – in their personal capacities, critics claim. Further, on the 6 December, the GNC and HoR signed a declaration of intent in Tunis, which envisages the creation of two ten-member bodies to form a unity government and draft a new constitution. This would pave the way for the holding of elections in two years.  The UN’s special envoy to Libya, Martin Kobler, dismissed this local process by saying the ‘train had already left the station’, asserting that the UN deal was the only one that would be considered, and imploring all factions to sign it. Consequently, the UN deal is unlikely to be respected by the GNC and HoR, and it is difficult to see the new ‘government’ operating out of Tripoli. Further, militia leaders were not involved in the negotiations, and are even less supportive of the agreement than the GNC and HoR. Thus, foreign security will likely be required to protect the new government, weakening its already diminished legitimacy and adding another centre of power into the current civil war. The power of the GNC and HoR will thus be denuded, allowing IS to gain more ground, especially as it begins to create institutions to govern areas it controls, and locals become disillusioned with the failure of the mainstream political actors abilities to govern and provide services.

The current situation is a throwback to what Libya faced in April 2011, when the UN and NATO continued  to  advocate regime change even after the Gadhafi regime hadaccepted the African Union’s road map which would have allowed  for  the development of a local political solution. The failure to involve local, influential actors in the process is a big reason the country currently finds itself in a situation of political gridlock and spiralling insecurity. The UN seems to have failed to learn these lessons. However, the agreement can still be saved if the UN is more flexible and willing to incorporate the local process, which on 14 December saw the heads of the GNC and HoR meet for the first time in an attempt to broker a solution. The UN would also need to stave off calls for foreign intervention and airstrikes – at least until a legitimate political solution incorporating all major players is concluded.

dissabte, 16 de juliol del 2016

Sources Say Haftar Behind Attempted Assassination of Libya’s Minister of Defense

15.07

Libya’s Minister of Defense Mahdi Al-Barghathi survived an attempted car bomb assassination on Wednesday night in the eastern city of Benghazi. Four people were were injured, including two children, according to Khalil Qwaider, director of media office at Benghazi Medical Center.
There has been conflicting statements about the cause of the explosion, with some claiming that it was a car bomb, and others asserting that it was a missile targeting a car near the Defense Minister’s motorcade that caused the explosion of three other cars.
Al-Bargathi’s media office announced on Thursday that he had survived an assassination attempt after a car passing in front of his motorcade exploded as he was leaving a military facility, the 204 tank battalion headquarters, which is under the control of General Khalifa Haftar. One of his guards was wounded by shrapnel during the attack.
The Minister was in Benghazi meeting with members of the House of Representatives (HoR) when the attack took place. Since early this year, the HoR has not been able to complete its responsibility and give a symbolic vote of confidence to the GNA’s cabinet as outlined in the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Members of the HoR have been divided on whether to support the GNA, particularly because of a contentious issue over who should be the Minister of Defense and the future role of Gen. Haftar.
No party has taken responsibility for the attack, however, the Presidential Council of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) issued a statement on Thursday condemning the attempted assassination of the Defense Minister. The Presidential Council called on the relevant authorities to open an investigation into the assassination and bring the perpetrators to justice. Most importantly the statement implies that political differences should not be settled through assassinations or acts of terrorism.
Some sources are saying that Haftar, who has rejected the GNA and its efforts to unite Libya’s militias and armed groups under a single military structure, was behind the assassination attempt. Haftar has rejected the GNA’s military operation in Sirte, and in the early stages threatened to launch his own military campaign against ISIS. While many political differences exist across Libya, Haftar’s continued efforts at blocking the HoR from handing over power to the GNA has proven to be the biggest obstacle in uniting factions across the country.
Haftar’s support has been declining within his own camp. Most recently the military leadership of his Operation Dignity has become divided amongst those who continue to support him and those who have turned their support towards the GNA in Tripoli.

Haftar’s Assassination Attempt of Libya’s Minister of Defense Jeopardizes His Remaining Power in the East

15.07

The Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Presidency Council were both born out of a Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) championed by the United Nations and signed by representatives from a broad range of Libyan society. Article VIII of the LPA requires that all powers of the senior military, civil and security posts stipulated in the Libyan legislations shall be transferred to the Presidency Council of the Council of Ministers immediately upon signing this Agreement. However, since the LPA was brokered on December 17, 2015, the House of Representatives (HoR) has refused to give its vote of confidence to the GNA, despite the fact that the majority of its members have expressed support of the GNA, because many have been threatened by General Khalifa Haftar and the members who support him who have blocked the HoR from meeting. HoR members loyal to Haftar are opposing the GNA and the LPA because they want General Haftar to remain in control of Libya’s army under the new unity government.
It is no surprise that the Libyan Minister of Defense Mihdi Al-Barghathi’s life is threatened as he is the subject of the most contentious political disagreement in Libya. He sits in the position that many of Haftar’s supporters believe he deserves and Haftar himself has demanded for, yet Prime Minister Fayez Al Sarraj chose Al-Barghathi instead. However, there is far more history between Haftar and Al-Barghathi than just the current conflict over who will be Defense Minister.
Al-Barghathi is one of the first officers who defected from the Libyan army pre-revolution, which was led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and joined the rebels in Benghazi, and fought several battles against Gaddafi since March 2011. After the victory of the Libyan Revolution, Colonel Al-Barghathi led Battalion 204, a battalion from Gaddafi’s Libyan Army, and joined Operation Dignity launched by retired General Khalifa Haftar, after the extremist group Ansar al-Sharia attacked his battalion.
Al-Barghathi fought against the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and Ansar al-Sharia in the western side of Benghazi for a year-and-a-half before he was given the position of Defense Minister in the GNA, despite Haftar opposing Al-Barghathi’s decision to accept the offer as Haftar did not recognize the GNA.
In response to Al-Barghathi’s support of the GNA and his efforts to unite militias and armed groups across the country in the fight against ISIS, last April Haftar ordered the arrest of Al-Barghathi on charges of treason. After returning from a meeting in Tunisia and landing in Abraq airport in the eastern city of Baydah, Haftar’s forces unsuccessfully attempted to arrest him.
Haftar’s determination to hold on to power and oppose Libya’s GNA and the Minister himself does not come unchecked. Haftar knows that his attempts at stopping or possibly assassinating the Minister will cause further division and threat to his power in eastern Libya, his only remaining stronghold in the country. Al-Barghathi, who is originally from eastern Libya, enjoys the support of the Al-Baraghathiya and Al-Awakir tribes which he belongs to. These tribes are far reaching in influence and presence from the east of Ajdabiya to the western prairie region, but especially in the outskirts of the city of Benghazi where they have the highest concentration.
In addition to tribal support, the Minister also has the loyalty of his men from Battalion 204, making it harder for the Commander of the HoR’s Army, Gen. Haftar, to enforce charges of treason or even assassinate him. Nevertheless, Haftar has his eyes locked onto the Ministry of Defense and the Libyan Army and is willing to maintain control at all costs.

Presidential Council sacks Dabbashi and appoints Al-Keeb as Ambassador to the UN

07.07

The Presidential Council of the UN-backed Government of National Accord has ordered the dismissal of the current Ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Dabbashi and replaced him with Abdelhakeem Al-Keeb, who was the first prime minister after the toppling over of the Gaddafi regime.
However, on Wednesday, Dabbashi said he has not received any formal order from any government demanding that he hand over his post to Al-Keeb.

Libya's unity government suffers blow as four ministers resign

01.07

The UN-backed government installed in March is still struggling to secure a vote of confidence from existing bodies

Hopes for the success of Libya's unity government were dealt a blow on Thursday with the resignation of four cabinet ministers.
Finance Minister Fakhir Muftah Bouferna, Justice Minister Jumaa al-Dersi, National Reconciliation Minister Abdel Jawadd al-Abadi and Economy and Industry Minister Abdel Matloub Bouferwa all submitted their resignations to the Presidential Council late on Thursday.
The Presidential Council accepted the resignations at around 3am local time, but did not make public the reason for the withdrawals.
The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) was installed in March with the aim of breaking months of political deadlock, which saw two rival governments – one based in the east of Libya and the other in the west – struggle for power.
The ministers who resigned on Thursday were all from the eastern bloc.
Since being flown into Libyan capital Tripoli under UN protection, the GNA has struggled to achieve unity, and neither of the two previous rival governments has put through a successful vote of confidence in it.
“The division between east and west has deepened since the Presidential Council [of the GNA] arrived in Tripoli,” independent Libya analyst Karim Munir told AFP on Thursday.
Despite ongoing political deadlock, the GNA has managed to secure some successes, achieving a rapprochement between rival central banks and national oil companies.
Military forces allied to the GNA have also managed to make headway against the Islamic State group, clearing the militants from a 280-kilometre stretch of coastline near the city of Sirte.  

WESTERN RESPONSE 11.07

11.07

On 8 July, a widely publicized leak shed light on active Western military support for Khalifa Haftar and the LNA. Air traffic recordings, reportedly obtained from inside the LNA’s Benina Air Force Base suggest that Haftar is receiving support from French, British and US forces, despite his opposition to the UN-Mediated and Internationally supported Government of National Accord (GNA). The tapes feature pilots and air traffic controllers speaking in Arabic and English, with separate British, American, French and Italian accents being heard.
The leak has caused disarray in the GNA camp, especially within the ranks of Islamists.  This new information is seen as evidence of a Western betrayal of the terms of the Libyan Political Agreement that produced the GNA. This development is likely to fuel further suspicion within the GNA’s coalition, and could possibly facilitate some reunions between Misratans and Islamist hardliners .  Their alliance was previously split during the political dialogue, in favor of rapprochement between ‘moderate’ Misratan forces with those of the eastern Federalists.
Speaking at a House of Lords Committee hearing on 7 July, Britain’s Ambassador to Libya Peter Millett said that he that he had visited Tripoli five times since the arrival of the GNA, and that he had stayed overnight on his last visit. He said that the British Embassy’s presence was currently only in Tripoli, and that one or two British Embassy representatives would be in Tripoli “every week” from now on.  Millet did not provide a date for the formal reopening of the embassy.  On ISIS, Millett said there has been “rapid progress” that has forced ISIS into a “very small area of Sirte.”  He said it was not clear if the lower numbers of ISIS in Sirte were because ISIS had “dispersed” within Libya during the battle, and noted that if this was the case, ISIS in Libya would now “pose a different type of threat,” implying ISIS is returning to its roots as an insurgent rather than a state builder.

WESTERN RESPONSE 04.07

04.07

Western countries continue to project support for the Government of National Accord (GNA), with a number of representatives travelling to Tripoli throughout last week to discuss immediate assistance. Ambassadors from the UK, France and Germany met with the Presidency Council (PC) and the GNA on 30 June. Italy’s foreign undersecretary Vincenzo Amendola was in Tripoli on 3 July for talks with the PC as well. His delegation signed a strategic agreement with the Libyan Civil Aviation authority to reestablish air navigation protocols, key towards normalizing Libyan aviation operations. Italy is one of the most active supporters of the GNA, helping to treat wounded Bunyan Marsus fighters, and providing medical supplies for Misrata, Tripoli and Benghazi. Italy is also said to be involved in back-channeling between the Misratans and Khalifa Haftar, to help mediate a political resolution.
Russia is also emerging as a player that may facilitate such a deal. Haftar travelled to Moscow on 27 June, followed immediately by GNA deputy prime minister Ahmed Metig on 29 June, an influential Misratan leader who is known for his opposition to Haftar. Both visits came upon direct invitation from Moscow, but the optics of the visits revealed the Russian position on the GNA. Haftar met with head of Russia’s National Security Council, Defense Minister, and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to discuss arms supplies and political support, while Metig was only met by their respective deputies. Officially supportive of the process, Russia is skeptical of the GNA, seeing it as a Western implant and insisting that the GNA must first receive official endorsement by the House of Representatives (HoR).
Gulf countries such as Oman and Saudi Arabia are also likely to play a key role in attempting to broker an agreement in the near future.  UN Special Representative Martin Kobler met with HoR Chairman Ageelah Saleh, and a delegation of HoR members and eastern tribal leaders, in Muscat on 28 June.  Although Kolber said the meetings were positive, no breakthroughs were made. Rumors indicate that Saudi Arabia is also looking to take the lead in mediating a resolution between Saleh and GNA Prime Minister Fayez Serraj after Ramadan. During his visit to Tripoli on 3 July, Kobler said that a new political stage will commence after Ramadan, whereby only a unified military structure from the three regions under the GNA will be able to request lifting of the arms embargo.

diumenge, 10 de juliol del 2016

Faiez Serraj holds first official cabinet meeting

22.06

By Moutaz Mathi

The Government of National Accord has held its first cabinet meeting today in Tripoli, at the Bu Setta naval base. Presided over by Presidency Council head and prime minister Faiez Serraj, who was flanked by two of his deputies, Ahmed Maetig and Fathi Majbri, sixteen other members attended.
These included defence minister Mahdi Barghathi, foreign minister Mohamed Siala and interior minister Arif Khojja as well as at least one minister with special responsibilities.
The full cabinet, including the nine Presidency Council and the five special responsibility ministers, numbers 28 members.

How IS is surrounded in Sirte

22.06

Salem Taleb focuses on the Ouagadougou Centre with his binoculars. The Islamic State HQ in Sirte is three kilometres away but IS fighters are closer, about 1.5 kilometres, hiding in three buildings ahead of the checkpoint held by the Third Military Forces. It is a Misrati brigade and Salem Taleb belongs to it.
They have rockets, snipers and they use suicide cars. They currently attack at night because it’s a full moon,” Taleb told Libya Herald.
The checkpoint is south of Sirte, on the main road to Benghazi. Every 12 hours, a new team of a dozen men with machine guns change shift to control the area. The mission is very clear and simple: don’t move ahead and make sure no IS fighters escape.
“IS is trapped in a 25-square-kilometre area in Sirte. They can’t leave. We’ve decided to lay siege to them until they run out of ammunition,” a commander in the Bunyan Marsous operations room, said.
The IS zone is downtown between coastal districts nos. 1, 2 and 3 in the north to Ouagadougou centre in the south. Mohamed (he doesn’t want to give his real name) is in charge of intelligence. He updates a Google Earth map with IS fighters’ positions in the buildings in the city center with blue pins. “This strategy will cost less lives and less destruction than launching a massive offensive with airstrikes”, he explains.
Ibrahim Beitalmal, head of Misrata military council, estimates that around 500 IS fighters are left in Sirte out of the 2,500 there previously. Other militaries sources say between 800 and 1,000 have been killed, while the others managed to flee before the Bunyan Marsous forces surrounded the town. East of Sirte, in Harawa and Nuflyia, the military operation launched by Faiez Serraj’s internationally-recognised government, has drawn in the Petroleum Facilities Guards (PFG) led by Ibrahim Jedhran and Colonel Bashir Budafira from the Ajdabiya-Sirte operations room. Offshore, the sea access is protected by coast guards from the central sector.
We have two tugboats with machine guns on them, a 16-metre boat with light weapons and two Zodiac boats to protect the port. We have no help from other Libyan cities, not even from Tripoli”, Reda Essa, the local commander of the coast guards, says.
The plan is to destroy the Islamic State in Sirte within a month. So far the offensive, which started on 12 May, has killed about more than 200 of its fighters and wounded more than 500. “The Bunyan Marsous operation gathers brigades from western Libya towns and cities such as Misrata Tripoli, Janzour, Nalut, Zliten, Tajoura, the Wershefana area, and more,” Colonel Mohamed Gasri, spokesman for the operations room says. “Anyone can join us.”
He adds that even Khalifa Haftar is welcome if he recognises Faiez Serraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA). It may be a joke. Several other leading military figures like Ibrahim Baitalmal and Reda Essa told this newspaper that they would never accept Haftar among them.
Officially, a report is sent daily to the Presidency Council about the military situation in Sirte. But on the front, the brigade are more or less free to do what they want but they feel abandoned.
It’s me who decides who can leave the frontline for a while. I don’t have to refer to anyone regarding my brigade”, Rami Ragou, the chief of a brigade from Nalut, says. His men are in charge to protect the Zaafran roundabout, which is the west entrance of Sirte and well known as the place IS used to crucify “misbelievers”.
Rami Ragou complains that his group will run out of ammunition soon. “I haven’t received anything. We’ll have to go back to Nalut for ammunition.” All of his men and most of the fighters this newspaper had seen were without any basic military equipment such as helmets or bullet-proof jackets.
But the Bunyan Marsous operations room is allegedly receiving help from 15 to 20 advisers from British and American special forces.They help us to locate the IS fighters”, Mohamed Gasri said.

dijous, 7 de juliol del 2016

THE ANTI-ISIS COALITION (20.06)

The political damage to the Government of National Accord (GNA), following the attack on Ajdabiya on 18 June by Islamist militias, may undo fragile militia alliances in Tripoli and key towns in western Libya. Meanwhile, an escalation of open conflict between the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Islamist militias from western Libya is now very likely, and could potentially spill over into a broader tribal/regional conflict involving the LNA and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG).
The connection between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and its ‘affiliated’ anti-ISIS fighters has significantly unraveled after Islamist militias broke away from Bunyan Marsus. With the blessing of Sadeq Al Ghariyani, still seen by many as the legitimate Grand Mufti of Libya, the recently formed Benghazi Defense Brigade and Ajdabiya Liberation Operations Room attacked LNA units in Ajdabiya on 18 June. On 19 June, Ghariyani lashed out at the GNA’s Presidential Council statement, which condemned the attack, saying the GNA, Khalifa Haftar and Muamar Qadhafi are one and the same. Ghariyani’s response marks a significant escalation in rhetoric. Although events so far in 2016 have indicated a steady weakening of support for Islamist hardliners such as Ghariyani in western Libya, the breakdown of the GNA’s coalition following the Ajdabiya attack may once bring hardliners to the fore, undercutting attempts by ‘moderate’ factions to shore up the GNA, or conduct a sustained campaign against ISIS in Sirte. Further, the GNA’s inability to effectively support Bunyan Marsus fighters with critical medical and logistical support needed for the operation, has greatly damaged its credibility. Additionally, the GNA’s failure to secure such support from the West has led to resentment and ‘defections’ by former supporters.
Tensions between the LNA and PFG units loyal to Ibrahim Jadhran have also spiked, due to the ambivalence of the PFG towards the attack on the LNA in Ajdabiya. The Islamist militias retook the main Man-Made River station and sections of the industrial area in southern Ajdabiya on 18 June, before being repelled by the LNA and local volunteers, supported by LNA airstrikes. On 19 June, the GNA and its minister of defense, who was visiting Ras Lanuf and areas west of Sidra in the company of Ibrahim Jadhran on 17 June, issued scathing condemnations of the attack. However, backpedaling by certain members of the GNA, in addition to the PFG’s seeming indifference to the Ajdabiya attack, have only added to the perception in eastern Libya that the two groups are aligned with Islamist militias from the west.

ISIS IN ACTION

This week witnessed the slowing momentum of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) anti–ISIS operation in Sirte, as fierce ISIS counterattacks stalled the operation’s advance. This development is chiefly attributed to two factors: 1) ISIS is beginning to push back on the Bunyan Marsus advance inside Sirte, successfully and repeatedly hitting GNA forces behind their own front lines, and 2) the ‘defection’ of the hardline Islamist factions (e.g. Benghazi Defense Brigade) and other associated militias.
Although the GNA’s Misratan-led Bunyan Marsus coalition continued the previous week’s speedy advance into Sirte, taking control of the radio station, fodder factory and seizing a large arms depot on 13 June, the coalition lost control of Sirte’s port on 14 June, after a large ISIS counterattack managed to push the coalition back to the east. Currently, the port serves as a frontline, with Misratan forces situated on the eastern perimeter, and ISIS on the west. Small Libyan navy boats currently block the port, while airstrikes are ongoing against ISIS positions in the area.
On 14 June, ISIS launched an assault on the port, forcing Bunyan Marsus units positioned there to withdraw one kilometre to the east. ISIS militants also advanced to the west for the first time under cover of heavy artillery and rocket fire, successfully retaking Zafaraan roundabout.
On 15 June, ISIS renewed its assault on the port, as Bunyan Marsus forces bombarded the main ISIS headquarters in Sirte in Ouagadougou center with heavy artillery and airstrikes.
Most significantly on 16 June, ISIS was able to conduct four SVBIED attacks, one at Abu Grein 70 kilometres west of Sirte, and others at the power station and the fodder factory west of the city. The fierce ISIS response to the Bunyan Marsus advance, and the defection of several militias from the coalition has greatly slowed the momentum of the last three weeks.

Top U.S. Marine general recommends more aggressive Libya policy

KEN HANLY JUN 24, 2016

Marine Lieutenant General Thomas Waldhauser, who is President Barack Obama's nominee to head the US Africa Command, claimed that the U.S. military plans to counter the Islamic State (IS) in Libya "make no sense.

Waldhauser said the U.S. needs to take a tougher stance in Libya. The general appears a bit behind the times as IS is in dire straits in Libya, holding only part of the city of Sirte as its last territory in Libya. The entire city could fall within a few days. Waldhauser made the comments before the Senate Armed Services Committee last Tuesday. Waldhauser said: “I am not aware of any overall grand strategy at this point.” This is probably true, but the U.S. has been making some air-strikes against IS in the past in Libya and has a few Special Forces working with the mostly Misrata militia who are attacking the IS. There may be a few in Benghazi as well helping the Haftar forces of the Libyan National Army.
Waldhauser said that instability in Africa was to the IS advantage and that the group was shifting focus on the Libyan city of Sirte as a backup as it was failing elsewhere. The general should realize that the IS is failing In Sirte now as well and has lost all the surrounding territory it had previously occupied. He said that "despite a growing Daesh presence in the conflict-ridden country, the US military was not conducting any airstrikes." "Daesh" refers to the Islamic State. He said that targets were being developed but no flights had been flown. He said such attacks would be wise and he would welcome the authority to carry them out without having to receive permission from the White House. Notice there is not a word about seeking permission for the attacks from the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA). He fails to mention that GNA-loyal planes have carried out attacks and that the IS is virtually defeated except as an underground terrorist organization.
In response to Walhauser's remarks, Peter Cook, a Pentagon spokesperson, said that "we don't make a decision to carry out a military strike lightly." He said the U.S. had carried out airstrikes in the past and would consider doing so in the future. Last month, Marine General Joseph Dunford of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said the U.S. could deploy troops and equipment to Libya "any day now." Such plans have been put on hold. The GNA has asked only for help with training of its forces. No aid has been forthcoming for the militia, who have successfully encircled the IS in Sirte. The militia do not have basic equipment such as helmets and bullet proof vests that could reduce casualties from snipers. CIA Director John Brennan said that the IS had between 5,000 to 8,000 militants in Libya. This appears to be an estimate that is far too high.
Although suggesting a more aggressive policy Waldhauser said that the small number of troops on the ground in Libya are sufficient for the present. He claimed the troops were performing only advisory roles. He said he was not aware that the US had any "grand strategy" for Libya. If confirmed by the US Senate, Waldhause would replace Army Gen. David Rodriguez who has been head of the Africa Command since 2013.
When Waldhauser was asked by John McCain, the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, how he was "going to make a chicken salad" out of the situation in Libya, Waldhauser replied: “We have two significant objectives for the United States: one is to get the government of National Accord up and running, and the second is to disrupt [Islamic State or IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL] inside Libya.” The latter aim appears to have been almost accomplished already by Libyans themselves with very little help either from inside or outside Libya.


diumenge, 12 de juny del 2016

Top ISIS Commander Killed in Sirte

09.06

Hamid Malouqa Al-Zliteni, a top ISIS commander known as the “Emir of ISIS,” was reportedly killed on Thursday, among other high ranking ISIS commanders, after heavy clashes with Operation Strong Foundation (Albinyan Almarsous) forces.
In addition, five ISIS fighters who were captured by Government of National Accord (GNA) forces on Thursday said that three high level ISIS commanders had managed to escape the city amid the clashes.
Operation Strong Foundation forces (Alinyan Almarsous) mounted an attack on Sirte from three directions on Thursday, with the offensive being conducted by land, air and sea.
In addition, Libyan forces took control of Zafarana Square, where ISIS militants have been accused of executing at least 49 people, and  Ouagadougou conference hall, which is a major landmark in the city, and was used as the administrative centre of ISIS.
The Libyan navy said on Thursday evening that they had taken full control of the entire coast of Sirte, making it nearly impossible for ISIS fighters to flee by sea.
The capturing of Sirte is a huge setback for the extremist group, as they are also losing ground in Syria and Iraq.
Two weeks ago, top ISIS commander Luqman Abu Sakhr, also known as Khaled al-Shayab, was reportedly killed by Libyan soldiers in a battle in Al-Baghla, 60 kilometres from Sirte.
ISIS militants have taken control of Sirte, the hometown of ousted dictator Muammar Gaddafi, since June and have taken advantage of the ongoing conflict between Libya’s political and armed groups. Sirte is located on the coast between the Tripoli-based unity government in the west and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HOR) located in the east.
The liberation of Sirte from the threat of ISIS was a priority for Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj’s new unity government as Western powers expressed their growing fear that the extremist militant group could use the coastal city to orchestrate attacks against Europe.
ISIS forces may have lost control of Sirte, however, they may still be planning terrorist attacks in Libya, as some ISIS fighters have retreated to the desert to possibly regroup.
Mohamed al-Ghasri, a spokesman for the Libyan military said ISIS “Snipers are a concern to us because they shoot from long distances and that has hindered us in the battle inside the city.”
https://www.libyangazette.net/2016/06/09/top-isis-commander-killed-in-sirte/

12 freed Kadhafi-era officials murdered in Libya

12.06

Gunmen have killed 12 Libyans after their release from jail for taking part in acts of repression during the 2011 revolt against Moamer Kadhafi, officials said on Sunday.
A Tripoli court ordered the conditional release of the former regime officials on Thursday, and on Friday their bullet-riddled bodies were found in the capital, the prosecution said on its Facebook page.
An investigation into the murders has begun, it added.
The victims had been imprisoned on charges of committing abuses during the NATO-backed uprising that toppled and killed Kadhafi.
They were freed on condition that they report to the prosecutor every two weeks.
The UN special envoy to Libya Martin Kobler condemned the murders and called for a prompt and "transparent" investigation.
Kobler tweeted that he was "shocked and dismayed by the reports of murder of so many detainees released by a Tripoli court".
The Government of National Accord also denounced what it called a "despicable crime".
A statement on its Facebook page called on security and judiciary authorities to find the assailants and bring them to justice.
Seddiq es-Sour, of the prosecutor's office, told Libyan television the bodies were found in various parts of the capital and confirmed that all were former prisoners.
He said they had been arrested between 2011 and 2014.
The identities of the victims were not immediately released.
Earlier this month, es-Sour had said the supreme court had ordered the release of six Kadhafi regime officials pending an appeal, for reasons linked to their health and age.
Dozens of people are on trial in Libya for their role in the violent suppression of the revolt, including two sons of Kadhafi and ex-government officials.
In July 2015 several people were sentenced to death, including Seif al-Islam, Kadhafi's son and one-time heir apparent.

Al-Rwimy massacre and mixing cards

12.06

Killing Al-Rwimy’s prisoners is a hideous criminal act, may be the perpetrators felt that justice wasn’t held perfectly. Such thinking is against the law and Sharia. One of the reasons for such massacre is the absence of state control due to the proliferation of various kinds of weapons, besides the prevail security vacuum.
The crime wasn’t committed under the sight of the country; the accused were acquitted by the judiciary. Maybe the perpetrators are “the blood custodians” who revenge the prisoners for their part in suppressing and killing protesters during 2011 revolution in Tripoli.
Some thought the massacre could totally end reconciliation efforts and the Presidential Council (PC) as if the country is already stabilized and the government controls the whole state securely and administratively, while the fact is that the Government of National Accord (GNA) is facing many obstacles on different levels including security situation. The GNA is struggling to contain.
Common sense says that there should be a transparent and quick investigation to reveal all criminals who committed such act, and to cut the road in front of those who mix the PC cards and undermine its efforts, especially after the latest advances in Sirte.
From another side, the whole world welcomed the release of Gaddafi era prisoners, which it is considered as an important step towards achieving social peace and national reconciliation. The question here is why targeting a group of them? Who is the beneficial of killing the released prisoners?
Hence, there should be a thorough investigation to find all criminals and refer them to justice; there also should be an investigation in Derna massacres to know who is responsible for the air forces that killed children in Derna days ago. There should be investigations also in the crime of detaining dozens of prisoners in facilities affiliated to retired general Khalifa Haftar, including some who were assassinated outside the law framework.
Consequences that followed the death of Al-Rwimy prisoners prove that some parties try to mix all cards to confuse the (already weak) Presidential Council (PC). The crime is very strange, and if the target was revenge from Gaddafi regime prisoners, it should have been senior officials who were acquitted and the whole world watched how families welcomed them, and also they should have killed officials who are still inside prisons like Abdullah Al-Senussi.