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dijous, 6 de setembre del 2018

A Facebook War: Libyans Battle on the Streets and on Screens

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/world/middleeast/libya-facebook.html?smid=tw-nytimesatwar&smtyp=cur

By Declan Walsh and Suliman Ali Zway

04.09.2018

CAIRO — When a new bout of fighting between rival militias engulfed the Libyan capital in recent days, badly shaking the fragile United Nations-backed government, some combatants picked up rifles and rocket launchers and headed into the streets.

Others logged on to Facebook.

As rockets rained on parts of Tripoli, hitting a hotel popular with foreigners and forcing the airport to close, and 400 prisoners escaped from a jail, a parallel battle unfolded online. On their Facebook pages, rival groups issued boasts, taunts and chilling threats — one vowing to “purify” Libya of its opponents.

Some “keyboard warriors,” as Facebook partisans are known in Libya, posted fake news or hateful comments. Others offered battlefield guidance. On one discussion page on Thursday, a user posted maps and coordinates to help target her side’s bombs at a rival’s air base.

“From the traffic light at Wadi al Rabi, it is exactly 18 kilometers to the runway, which means it can be targeted by a 130 mm artillery,” the user, who went by the handle Narjis Ly, wrote on Facebook. “The coordinates are attached in the photo below.”

Social media enjoys outsize influence in Libya, a sparsely populated yet violently fractured country that is torn by a plethora of armed groups vying for territory and legitimacy. They battle for dominance on the streets and on smartphones.

But Facebook, by far the most popular platform, doesn’t just mirror the chaos — it can act as a force multiplier.

Armed groups use Facebook to find opponents and critics, some of whom have later been detained, killed or forced into exile, according to human rights groups and Libyan activists. Swaggering commanders boast of their battlefield exploits and fancy vacations, or rally supporters by sowing division and ethnic hatred. Forged documents circulate widely, often with the goal of undermining Libya’s few surviving national institutions, notably its Central Bank.

Facebook is coming under scrutiny globally for how its platform amplifies political manipulation and violence. In July, the company began culling misinformation from its pages in response to episodes in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and India where online rumors led to real-life violence against ethnic minorities.

On Wednesday, Facebook’s chief operating officer, Sheryl Sandberg, will defend the company’s efforts to limit disinformation and hate speech before the Senate Intelligence Committee, where she will testify along with Jack Dorsey, Twitter’s chief executive.

Facebook insists it is assiduously policing its raucous Libyan platform. It employs teams of Arabic-speaking content reviewers to enforce its policies, is developing artificial intelligence to pre-emptively remove prohibited content, and partners with local organizations and international human rights groups to better understand the country. A spokeswoman said: “We also don’t allow organizations or individuals engaged in human trafficking or organized violence to maintain a presence on Facebook.

Still, illegal activity is rife on Libyan Facebook.

The New York Times found evidence of military-grade weapons being openly traded, despite the company’s policies forbidding such commerce. Human traffickers advertise their success in helping illegal migrants reach Europe by sea, and use their pages to drum up more business. Practically every armed group in Libya, and even some of their detention centers, have their own Facebook page.

Facebook removed several pages and posts after The New York Times flagged them to the spokeswoman on Sunday. But others remained.

“The most dangerous, dirty war is now being waged on social media and some other media platforms,” Mahmud Shammam, a former information minister, said last week as fighting ripped through the Tripoli suburbs. “Lying, falsifying, misleading and mixing facts. Electronic armies are owned by everyone, and used by everyone without exception. It is the most deadly war.”

Mr. Shammam made his declaration, naturally, on Facebook.

A Force for Unity, Then Disunity
Facebook helped Libyans unite in 2011 to oust Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, who for decades had forbidden people to buy fax machines or even printers without official permission.

Even then, the platform was prone to abuse.

A vicious hate campaign directed at suspected Qaddafi supporters, and which was fanned by incendiary social media posts, led to African migrants being jailed or lynched, and caused all 30,000 residents of a town called Tawergha to flee for their lives. Today, most Tawerghans live in refugee camps.

“The social media echo chamber played out in deadly ways for them,” said Fred Abrahams, an associate director at Human Rights Watch.

Facebook’s influence today is largely a product of Libya’s dysfunction. The country has no central authority and most of its TV stations and newspapers are tied to armed groups, political factions or foreign powers like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Many Libyans spend long hours stranded inside their homes because it can be dangerous to go out. The electricity can be off for 12 hours a day. So they turn to Facebook to find out what’s going on.

“The phone might be the only thing that is working,” said Jalel Harchaoui, a Paris-based analyst with North Africa Risk Consulting. “People are traumatized after the years of fake news under Qaddafi. They thirst for truth.”

Some 181 million people use Facebook every month across the Middle East and North Africa, the Facebook spokeswoman said. She replied to questions by email on condition of anonymity in line with Facebook policy, which the company said was mainly for security reasons. For Libya’s armed factions, that reach makes the platform a powerful tool for propaganda and repression.

In the eastern city of Benghazi, which is dominated by the strongman Gen. Khalifa Hifter, a special online unit affiliated with his militia, the Libyan National Army, scours Facebook for signs of dissent or for suspected Islamists. Some have been arrested and jailed, and others forced to flee the city, according to human rights groups.

There are similar pressures in Tripoli, where the Special Deterrence Force, a militia led by a conservative religious commander, Abdulrauf Kara, patrols Facebook with a moralizing zeal reminiscent of Saudi Arabia’s once-feared religious police.

Last year his militia detained 20 participants in a Libyan version of Comic-Con, the comic book conference. The militants said they were outraged by photos on Facebook showing young Libyans dressed as characters like Spider-Man and the Joker. Some detainees said they were beaten in custody.

In August 2017, a writer named Leila Moghrabi was hit by a blizzard of Facebook attacks over a collection of short stories and poetry she edited. “I wish you get killed, not arrested,” read one typical message. Three Muslim clerics denounced Ms. Moghrabi in thundering sermons that circulated on Facebook; next came word that the Special Deterrence Force was coming to arrest her.

She leapt into a car with her husband and children and drove to Tunisia, where they live in exile. “We literally left everything behind,” she said by phone.

Others never made it to the border. Jabar Zain, a 30-year-old activist who was prominent on Facebook, has not been seen since he was abducted by a militia in September 2016, according to Amnesty International, which said he was targeted because of statements he made on Facebook. Amnesty has documented several such cases.

In 2014, suspected Islamists in Benghazi shot dead two secular teenage activists, Tawfik Bensoud and Sami al-Kwuafi, after their names appeared on a hit list that circulated on Facebook.

A Fight Foreshadowed
The fighting in Tripoli over the past week was the worst in years, leaving at least 47 people dead, including children, and over 130 wounded, according to health officials. At least 400 prisoners escaped from a jail on Sunday after inmates overpowered guards. The chaos poses a growing threat to the United Nations-backed unity government, which has declared a state of emergency in the capital.

Online boasts and threats foreshadowed the fighting.

Although Tripoli seemed calm this year, public unease grew toward the four big militias that control the city under the umbrella of the fragile unity government, which is headed by Fayez Seraj. The militia commanders are widely viewed as unaccountable and corrupt, using their access to the Central Bank to buy United States dollars at the official rate, which is five times cheaper than the street price.

One commander, Haitham Tajouri, drew attention by posting photos to Facebook flaunting his lavish lifestyle — foreign vacations, designer suits and an armored S.U.V. — at a time when many Libyans were wallowing in economic hardship.

Such ostentatious displays helped fuel resentments among rival groups seeking to share in the pie. They boiled over last week when a militia known as Kaniyat from a town called Tarhouna, 45 miles southeast of Tripoli, launched an assault on the capital.

As Kaniyat’s fighters engaged in artillery battles in the southern suburbs, it sought to tap into public anger by denouncing its rivals as the “Islamic State of public money” and promising to “cleanse” them from Libya.

Libya’s factions are motivated by more than what they see on Facebook, said Mr. Harchaoui, the analyst. But, he added, “it can be the final straw.”

On Monday afternoon, Facebook suddenly went down in Tripoli. The local internet provider, Libya Telecom and Technology, which insisted it had not blocked Facebook, said it was investigating

Beating the Moderators
Facebook employs Arabic-language reviewers who weed out illegal and forbidden content on its Libyan pages — part of a global team that works in over 50 languages, the company says.

“We work hard to keep Facebook safe and to prevent people from using our tools to spread hate or incite violence,” the spokeswoman said. The company engages with academics and civil society groups to “better understand local issues and context so we can take more effective action against bad actors on Facebook,” she added.

But Libyans are adept at circumventing such controls. Users often take screenshots of contentious posts, and redistribute them as images if the original text is removed by Facebook’s moderators.

Although Facebook prohibits firearms trading between individuals, numerous pages present themselves as online weapons bazaars. On the page “Libya’s Weapons Market,” sellers advertise machine guns, antiaircraft guns and artillery shells. Last month, for instance, one user posted an image of a Russian PM machine gun. “Message me if you are serious about purchasing,” the message said.

On Monday, Facebook said it had removed those posts, as well as two other pages cited by The New York Times that advertised the services of human traffickers sending illegal migrants by boat to Europe. “We are investigating to understand why we didn’t take action sooner,” the spokeswoman said.

Facebook has developed tools that scan for prohibited content, which human moderators can then remove. These programs flagged 85 percent of the “violent content” that was removed or given a warning label in the first three months of 2018, the spokeswoman said. But the programs struggle to identify subtler violations such as hate speech or violent threats, which are mostly reported by everyday users. This can make removal slow, particularly in areas where locals may be less inclined to report the posts.

In 2011, Facebook reflected the “extraordinary” opening up of Libyan society after four decades of dictatorship under Colonel Qaddafi, said Mary Fitzgerald, an independent researcher on Libya. ”Everyone was on Facebook. There was a very rambunctious conversation, and a lot of debate.”

But as the years went on, the people driving the conflict began to “talk about how social media is one of their most important weapons,” she said. That bred a deep ambivalence among many Libyans toward the media they consume so voraciously.

“So many times over the past seven years,” she added, “I heard people say that if we could just shut down Facebook for a day, half of the country’s problems would be solved.”

LIST OF ARMED GROUPS IN LIBYA

PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL 
GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL ACCORD

Presidential Guard
Ministries of the Interior
Special unit anti-terrorist (Mohammed al Zain – Misurata)
Ministries of the Defense
Chief of Staff of Defense of the Government of the National Agreement of Libya
 General Abdulrahman Al Tawil, 
Unit
Special unit
Revolutionary Brigades of Tripoli
Special Deterrent Force ( Radaa), salafit ( Facebook)
Abu Selim Brigade (supported by the EU)
Nawassi Battalion (supported by EU)
Brigade 301 (1)
Petroleum Facilities Guard
Libyan Navy
Libyan Air Force 
Abu Sleem Central Security Force
Supported by:
 United States 
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Marine Corps
 United Kingdom
SAS
SBS
 Italy
Elements of the San Marco Marine Brigade
  •  United Nations
  •  European Union

FREE ARMED GROUPS 
The groups are for large geopolitical belonging, the fluid situation does not allow safe groupings
Armed groups A
Brigade at the Samoud of Salah al Badi, Libyan dawn

Armed groups B
Seventh Brigade of Tarhuna  of Salah Badi Facebook)
Al Kani militias
Misrata Brigades
Zawia militias
  • Zintan Brigades
    • Lightning Bolt Brigade
    • Qaaqaa Brigade
    • Civic Brigade

Armed groups C
  •  Tuareg militias
  •  Toubou militias
  • Fajr Libya militia
  • Misrata Military Council
  • Al-Bunyan al-Marsous
  •  Federal Cyrenaica
  • Mercenaries (allegedly)
  • Sabratha Military Council/Sabratha Revolutionary Brigades



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Libyan Interim Government (Tobruk-based)
The Chief Of Staff Of The Libyan Army”
Major General Hussein Abdallah 
  •  Libyan National Army
  •  Libyan Ground Forces
  • Benghazi Security Directorate
  • Tajoura Battalion
  •  Libyan Air Force (parts)
  • Tripoli Brigade
  •  Al-Saiqa
  •  JEM (from 2016)
Allied armed groups:
  • Mercenaries (allegedly)
  • National Forces Alliance
  • Russian private military contractors
Supported by:
Egypt
Egyptian Army
Egyptian Air Force
United Arab Emirates 
Union Defence Force
Algeria
France 
Special Operations Command
DGSE
Russia
Chad
Belarus

ISLAMIC ARMED GROUPS 
Groups that have participated in the different stages of the civil war, dispersed, surmounted, or occupying different areas.
Work in progress
  •  Libya Shield Force
    • Western Shield
    • Central Shield
  • LROR
  • Presidential Guard
  • National Guard
Allied armed groups:
  • Fajr Libya militia
  •  Muslim Brotherhood
    • Justice and Construction Party
    • Awakening (unclear)
  • Brigade al-Marsah
  • Brigade Sherikhan
  • Union for Homeland
  • Misrata Brigades
  • Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade
  • Democratic Party
  • Mercenaries (allegedly)
  • Amazigh militias
Other actor:
  • Sudan
  • Qatar
  • Turkey

 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2014–17)
  •  Military of ISIL
  •  Wilayat Barqa (2014–17)
  •  Wilayat Tripolitania (2014–17)
  •  Wilayat Fezzan (2014–17)

Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries (2014–17)
  •  Ansar al-Sharia (2014–17)
  • Libya Shield 1 (2014–17)
  • February 17th Martyrs Brigade (2014–17)
  • Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade (2014–17)
  • Jaysh al-Mujahidin
  • Brega Martyrs Brigade
Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna
  • Ansar al-Sharia (Derna)
  • Abu Salim Martyrs
Benghazi Defense Brigades
Ajdabiya Shura Council
Allied armed groups:
  • Misrata Brigades
  •  LROR
  • Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia)
  •  Al-Qaeda
    •  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (2014–15; alleged since)
http://www.worldinwar.eu/list-of-armed-groups-in-the-libyan/

dimarts, 21 d’agost del 2018

Forces on the Libyan ground: Who is Who

Arnaud Delalande 
28 May 2018

On April 26, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's plane landed at Benina airport, which ended speculation about his very poor health or death after his hospitalization in Paris for two weeks. At 75, Marshal Haftar is considered the strongman of eastern Libya. He is at the head of the so-called Libyan National Army. This army is actually a group of militias rotating around a regular army nucleus representing a force of about 25,000 men. It is not a solid and coherent block. Each militia has its own agenda and its ambitions. It is not uncommon for LNA units to clash with each other for various reasons (land holdings, arrest of one or more of their members, smuggling, etc.). The cohesion of the whole is so fragile that events such as the recent hospitalization of Marshal Haftar in Paris and uncertainty about his state of health threaten at any time to violently split this army apart.

THE "REGULAR" LIBYAN NATIONAL ARMY

Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s regular ground forces are composed of several dozen units – two mechanized infantry brigades, one tank brigade, three artillery brigades, one special forces brigade, two "Rada Deterrent Forces" grouping several brigades and about a hundred larger or smaller units of brigade type, infantry battalions, light battalions, border guards, security forces – with a total of about 7,000 members. In September 2017, the President of the House of Representatives, Ageela Saleh, ordered the creation of four military zones covering the central part and most of the west coast of Libya. These are: the military zone of the Gulf of Sirte, with its headquarters in Ajdabiya; the military zone of Misrata, with headquarters in Khoms; the military zone of Tripoli, with headquarters in Suq Al-Khamis; the military zone of Zawia, with headquarters in Sabratha. This announcement was quite symbolic since only part of the first, the area of the Gulf of Sirte, is in the hands of the LNA. It extends from Sirte in the west to Sidi Abdelati, about sixty kilometers north of Ajdabiya. Its southern limit is Zillah. There are two other military zones, one extending from the south of the central zone (Gulf of Sirte) to the southern borders of the country and the eastern zone from Benghazi to Tobruk.

AUXILIARY MILITIAS

Marshal Haftar can also count on some 12,000 auxiliary militia members, including several Sudanese units from Darfur, and Chad militias. The deployment of Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (ALS/MM) armed groups began in March 2015 in the Ubari, al-Waw and al-Wig areas. In March 2016, they gained their autonomy and played a key role in the capture and protection of oil installations by the LNA. The Sudan Liberation Army/Al-Nur is also engaged alongside the LNA with 1,500 fighters by mid-2016. The Chadian group “Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement” (RFC) began operating in southeast Libya at the end of 2015. It was deployed in the oil crescent alongside the LNA. The Libyan National Army can also count on about 500 members of the Al-Furjan clan, as well as an indeterminate number of Petroleum Facilities Guards (PFG) dissatisfied with the replacement at their head of Ibrahim Jadhran by the new commander Idris Saleh Abu Khamada.

ZINTAN BRIGADES

The forces of the western city of Zintan played a crucial role during the 2011 war, and were deployed in both Tripoli and the southern region of Fezzan. Expelled from both areas in 2014, they built a well-trained and equipped force, with around2,500 soldiers, and control a former Gaddafi airbase at Al Watiya. The Zintanis are grouped mainly in the Jabal Nafusah mountains and in the Jafarah coastal plain. They have had a tense relationship with Marshal Haftar since 2012, although formally part of the LNA. The Zintan Military Council is neither an active opponent nor a close ally of Marshal Khalifa Haftar, but has benefited from the LNA's logistics network and arms procurement efforts.

TRIBAL ARMED GROUPS

After the 2011 revolution, the Awlad Sulayman tribal group took advantage of changes in the local tribal power structure to take over Sebha's security services and regional traffic activities. This led the group to conflict with the Toubou and Tuareg, who traditionally controlled cross-border smuggling routes. The result was an open war in Sebha in 2012 and 2014. One of the main commanders of Awlad Sulayman at the time was Ahmad al-Utaybi. In May 2016, the Awlad Sulayman brigade (now called the 6th Brigade) was engaged in the battle of Sirte alongside the militias of al-Bunyan al-Marsous. On February 20, 2018, al-Utaybi opposed the integration of the 6th Brigade to the LNA as desired by Marshal Haftar, declaring that the loyalty of his brigade went to the Ministry of Defense of the Government of Tripoli. A few days later, he was replaced by LNA Brigadier General Khalifa Abdulhafith Khalifa.

THE LNA AIR FORCE

The Libyan National Army Air Force has potentially twenty seven fighter-bombers in its fleet (eighteen MiG-21s, four MiG-23s, three Su-22s and two Mirage F1s), seven Mi-24/35 gunships, fourteen various Mi-8/14/17 transport helicopters and a few transport cargos (an Il-76 and a C-130 overhauled thanks to foreign technicians). Less than half of this fleet were aircraft and helicopters of the former Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF), the most part was provided by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates between October 2014 and June 2015: eight MiG-21MFs, about sixteen helicopters, spare parts and technical support. In 2015, the UAE has also donated two of its Schiebel S-100 Camcopters UAV operating from Benina airbase. With the exception of the MiG-23s, which are all engaged in the fighting, and the Mirage F1s and Su-22s used for reconnaissance missions in western Libya, only a handful of MiG-21s is operational. As for helicopters, it is difficult to know their availability rate because many of them no longer have an identification number in order to mask their quantity. Haftar can only rely on around ten aircraft to carry out his "anti-terrorist operations". Since the Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov’s visit and the meeting with Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and the head of Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov in January 2017, Field Marshal Haftar could count on increasing Russian technical support with the delivery of former Russian MiG-23 spare parts the following weeks at al-Abraq airbase. In the same period, the LNA also took delivery of former Sudanese MiG-23 spare parts.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AERIAL SUPPORT

Between May and June 2016, the United Arab Emirates deployed six IOMAX AT-802U Air Tractors and three Wing Loong II drones at Al-Khadim air field in al-Marj in eastern Libya. The first engagements of this fleet were performed the following weeks against the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC). Emirati aircraft were fully engaged in support of LNA ground forces in Benghazi. Between September and November 2016, the BRSC claimed that Air Tractors and Wing Loong drones were involved in about a hundred bombing missions. By summer 2016, extension work started on the airbase to increase its capacity. The existing parking area was equipped with a dozen hangars, half of them used to house aircraft and drones and a second parking area was under construction in the base’s southeast corner. A dozen large hangars were built and half of the new tarmac was completed on February 2017. It was fully completed in December after a six-month work break. The size of these infrastructures is large enough to accommodate fighter jets like F-16s, Mirage 2000s or even Rafales. Work was temporally stopped following the end of the battle for the liberation of Benghazi and it is unclear if the UAE fleet is still in Libya or not.

EGYPT AIR FORCE SUPPORT

Although Egypt had already performed airstrikes in Libya in February 2015 against ISIS in Derna in retaliation for the killing of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christian migrant workers, aerial support for Field Marshal Haftar's forces almost became official in March and May 2017 with the retaking of the oil infrastructure by the Benghazi Defend Brigade (BDB) and especially with the supposed retaliation strikes against the alleged perpetrator of the monastery attack in Egypt’s Minya province claimed by ISIS. In fact, the Egyptian Air Force carried out air raids against BDB militants in Hun and Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC). The latest attacks by ISIS militants in a Sufi mosque in Bir al-Abed in northern Sinai that killed 305 people will certainly compel the Egyptians to reduce their support for the LNA to focus their forces against Sinai-based Islamist militants.
To date, the Libyan National Army has still not managed to secure Benghazi although the city was announced as being released several months ago. To this must be added the regular IS attacks in Ajdabiya, the threat that still hangs over the oil terminals and the retaking of the beleaguered city of Derna which is still waiting. This was a disappointment for all Haftar supporters, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and even France, which no longer considers Haftar as a privileged interlocutor and also rely on the GNA.