What are the implications of Turkey's military pledge to Libya?

https://www.euronews.com/2019/12/16/what-are-the-implications-of-turkey-s-military-pledge-to-libya-euronews-answers

By Sandrine Amiel & agencies • last updated: 17/12/2019

Turkey is ready to send troops to Libya, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Sunday, after Ankara and Tripoli's internationally recognised government signed a security deal.

"We will be protecting the rights of Libya and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean," Erdogan told Turkish television. "We are more than ready to give whatever support necessary to Libya."

The bilateral deal, which provides for a quick reaction force if requested by Tripoli, was sent to parliament on Saturday but it is unclear when a vote will take place.

Ankara's latest move comes as the Libyan war enters a crucial stage, with eastern Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar launching what he said would be a "final battle" for Tripoli.

His offensive against the UN-recognised government began in April but has so far stalled outside the capital.

Euronews explores the reasons behind Turkey's military pledge to Tripoli and its possible consequences on the regional and international stage, at a time of rising tensions between Ankara and its European allies.

What's Turkey's interest in getting involved?

Turkey has said the military pledge to Libya was primarily motivated by legality.

Haftar "is not a legitimate leader...and is representative of an illegal structure," Erdogan said after meeting in Istanbul with Fayez al-Sarraj, prime minister of Libya's Government of National Accord.

But Turkey's interest in Libya is not new, expert Barah Mikail, director of Stractegia Consulting and Associate Professor at Saint Louis University in Madrid told Euronews.

"Ankara has sought to develop a policy of influence in the aftermath of the fall of Libya's former ruler Moammar Gaddafi," in 2011 Mikail said.

"But with Commander Khalifa Haftar's offensive against Tripoli in April 2019, the Turks found new ways to expand their political and military influence on the ground."

According to the expert, Turkey's strategic interest is to develop a Mediterranean policy which may compete with that of the Europeans.

Economic calculations are another factor, Mikail told Euronews, with Libya offering "huge prospects" in terms of infrastructure development and reconstruction.

Turkey may furthermore want to display its military capabilities by selling weapons to the so-called Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli.

"There could also be an ideological component to explore, given that Fayez Sarraj's government has the reputation to be subjected - even if it is less than before - to the influence of Islamists, in a context in which the Islamist orientations and beliefs of Turkish President Erdogan are all but secret," the expert told Euronews,

"But I doubt that this component prevails over the geopolitical aspects," he added.

How likely is a Turkish intervention?

According to the text of the military agreement sent to Turkish lawmakers, Tripoli could request vehicles, equipment and weapons for use in army, navy and air operations. It also provisions for new intelligence sharing.

Even before this agreement, there was ongoing military cooperation between Tripoli and Ankara. Last week, the UN Security Council found that Turkey, along with Jordan and the UAE, was among the governments violating the weapons embargo in Libya by arming warring sides.

As noted by Mikail, President Erdogan has so far emphasised Turkey's readiness to put military means at Sarraj's disposal -- rather than sending straight troops on the ground.

"Obviously we can't rule out anything but I would take what the Turks are saying about their will to send troops to Libya with a pinch of salt," the analyst said

"The Turks say that the simple fact for Tripoli to officially request such an intervention would make it happen. I dare to believe that Fayez Sarraj and his entourage will not only have to take into account the reluctance of their European counterparts on the issue but also calculate the risks of such an intervention before deciding to call it."

"And the risks associated with such an intervention are considerable," Mikail added.

Even within Turkey, there is far from consensus behind sending troops to Libya.

Utku Cakirozer, a lawmaker from Turkey's main opposition CHP and a member of the NATO parliamentary assembly told Reuters: "Turkey should not enter into a new adventure."

"The AKP government should immediately stop being a party to the war in Libya."

How would it affect regional stability?

Ankara's latest move risks confrontation with forces led by Khalifa Haftar based in eastern Libya, further destabilising a volatile region.

"A Turkish intervention in Libya would only increase the current destabilisation and raise the risks that other foreign armed troops may imitate the Turkish move," Mikail said.

"We have the ability to (intervene in Libya) but we haven't," Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi told a youth forum in the Red Sea resort of Sharm El-Sheikh.

Sisi expressed his support for "national armies" in Libya, an apparent reference to Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA).

Egypt is a regional rival of Turkey and one of the main backers of the LNA, which is battling forces aligned with the internationally recognised government in Tripoli.

In the past, Egypt has carried out airstrikes in Libya and has channelled material support to the LNA, according to UN experts.

"The UN Special Envoy to Libya keeps denouncing the fact that foreign interference is one of the biggest obstacles to solving the Libyan crisis -- he is a hundred times right," Barah said.

What would be the impact on EU-Turkey relations?

Turkey's pledge to offer military support to Libya comes at a time of heightened tensions between Ankara and EU countries on a number of fronts -- not least, Ankara's military intervention against the Kurds in Syria earlier this year.

Libya: The Haftar Match

12.04.2019

Arturo Varvelli

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/libya-haftar-match-22837

Libya seems to be sinking into civil war again: forces under the control of the Cyrenaica strongman General Khalifa Haftar have launched a military strike on Tripoli. The capital is held at the moment by militias supporting the Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Sarraj with UN backing.

Khalifa Haftar is probably aiming to enter the capital as the saviour of his country; he reckons the population is tired of chaos and will support him; he feels the militia leaders have full bellies and little appetite for fighting. There is not much ideology at stake: the militias offer little vision, apart perhaps from certain Salafist groups, “madhkalis” operating inside Haftar’s grouping, the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA). The main motives are opportunistic, and that’s what Haftar is counting on: if he can display enough power he can deter the various armed groups in the capital from fighting him, or even get them onto his side. The General enjoys financial support from the UAE and probably from Saudi Arabia; he has military support from Russia, which has Wagner group mercenaries in Libya; but he also has political support from the French, and probably intelligence support, too. Haftar has followed his usual style: he offers talks, shakes hands, sits at the negotiating table. But his actions on the ground present the international community with a fait accompli. He knows perfectly well there are no real constraints on what he does. The United Nations and the international communityprovide none; beyond face-saving declarations, their support for Fayez al-Sarraj is feeble, barely more than formal. The United States has been a distant spectator of this crisis at least since Trump came to office. And as for the European Union, its latest communiqué doesn’t even mention Haftar by name, or lay the blame for the violent flare-up at his door: it merely calls on “all parties involved” to honour their agreements.

There are two constraints on Haftar: first, he does not have the overwhelming military force needed to take the capital by fighting; second, he cannot allow himself a blood-bath if he wants to preserve some legitimacy at home and abroad. The right time for his take-over has never quite come. He won’t find it easy to take the capital while the Misrata militia and others are willing to defend it. It took him years of fighting before he freed Benghazi, and he has already had losses just tackling Tripoli’s suburbs. His slow progress is at least showing him who he can count on and who’s ready to fight him. Negotiations in the shadows will continue; so will his propaganda presenting him as a “liberator” fighting terrorists. Over time he benefits from his support abroad and from the general climate of appeasement. He knows his credibility will depend on how he comes to power: that will affect everyone involved, in Libya and abroad, and could shift the balance of support.

Haftar’s military push is a mixture of daring unscrupulousness and calculated risk. He will probably have been comforted by the external support he has won in various meetings recently, and may think he has a green light to try for the capital. On 28 February al-Sarraj and Haftar met in Abu Dhabi and shook hands on a deal for elections before the year’s end. Since then, each of the two sides has met its international protectors: Sarraj was received in Doha by the Emir of Qatar, al-Thani, on 10 March and in Ankara by the Turkish President Erdogan on the 20th. Haftar had meetings in Riyadh on 27-28 March with King Salman of Saudi Arabia and his heir apparent Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. His object is to take the capital swiftly by getting some local militias to change sides. He aims to win the support of the population, but has been disappointed there. Now it would seem he can hardly retreat, because that would be too big a political set-back; but on the other hand he probably faces a more drawn-out fight, and the support (or mediation) of his international sponsors will be decisive. It remains to be seen whether one or two of the international protectors who have been encouraging him so far think better of giving such support. Then again, if the international community’s response to his offensive remains as flabby as it has been so far, Haftar might see room to continue his military action, possibly with greater obstinacy and more violence.

One last consideration: the General is 75 years old, and had a spell in a Paris hospital a year ago; he doesn’t seem to be in the best of health. Even if it looks as if he can win Tripoli soon, keep power in a Libya that lacks government institutions, and presumably bring the country some stability, how long is that stability likely to last?

Averting a Full-blown War in Libya

10.04.2019

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/averting-full-blown-war-libya

Fighting between forces loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and allies of the UN-backed government in Tripoli threatens a bloodbath and a regional proxy war. Libya’s international partners should urgently take steps to avoid a major battle and get both sides back to the negotiating table under a new format.

A dangerous military confrontation is underway in Libya between east-based forces loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and armed groups allied to the UN-backed government in Tripoli. So far, international diplomatic responses have been too timid to prevent an all-out fight for the capital. If unleashed, a full-fledged offensive could become a proxy war between regional powers and cause innumerable casualties as well as immense devastation while prolonging Libya’s post-2011 troubled state. Statements from UN member states, including Haftar’s backers, urging parties to exercise restraint or calling on them to freeze their positions or even withdraw and resume UN-led political talks, are unlikely to be effective unless backed by a credible threat of sanctions and unless regional actors refrain from fuelling the war. The UN should also encourage the parties to return to the negotiating table by offering a new three-track negotiating format that addresses the warring sides’ core political, military and financial concerns. If outside actors are serious in their calls to stop a full-blown war, now is the time to act.

The escalation started on 3 April when Libyan National Army (LNA) forces under Haftar’s command launched a major military offensive, named “Flood of Dignity”, deploying thousands of men and heavy artillery from their rear base in eastern Libya into the west of the country with the stated aim of capturing the capital. The offensive came despite repeated warnings by Libya’s international partners to desist and in the midst of a visit by UN Secretary-General António Guterres to support a UN-sponsored national conference scheduled for mid-April.

LNA forces began to advance on Tripoli in the apparent belief that their international supporters, which include the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France and Russia, would tolerate or support their offensive; in particular, Libyans noted that the LNA began its offensive shortly after Haftar returned from a visit to Riyadh. LNA forces also appeared confident that their advance would not face significant resistance from their Tripoli-based adversaries and enjoyed the support of local residents. They first took the town of Gharian, 100 km south of Tripoli, and then some smaller towns west of the capital. Currently, fighting is ongoing in and around the non-operational Tripoli International Airport, which they captured on 6 April, as well as in neighbourhoods on the capital’s southern outskirts. On 8 April, Tripoli’s only functioning airport at Mitiga was struck from the air, apparently by the LNA, forcing its evacuation.

Over the previous month, Haftar built up his forces in central Libya and reportedly sent weapons to western LNA outposts, but few appeared to believe he would make any moves to defy the U.S., in particular. Washington had cautioned him verbally not to move into western Libya, where the UN-backed government and Misratan forces, U.S. allies in the fight against ISIS in 2015-2016, are based. U.S. admonitions were part of a coordinated international effort from late February to persuade Haftar to accept a UN-backed political deal with Faiez Serraj, the head of the Tripoli-based government, to unify the country’s divided institutions, including the military, and place Haftar at the helm of the armed forces. Although some diplomats and officials in the Tripoli government believed a deal was imminent, Haftar never agreed to it, arguing that the presence of militias in Tripoli would prevent its implementation. He is certain that ordinary Libyans, frustrated by the militias’ power in the capital and the lack of security there, support him.

The UN-backed government in Tripoli has responded to the LNA offensive by mobilising its allied forces; the decision by leaders in the city of Misrata, which has the most sizable and well-equipped military forces in western Libya, to join the fight suggests that the Tripoli government and its supporters are not about to surrender. A wide range of armed groups based in western Libya are joining the Tripoli-led counteroffensive, which they see as a way to defend the civilian state against the threat of authoritarianism and to uphold the country’s revolutionary legacy against the return of the Gaddafi-era regime, some of whose leaders have openly supported Haftar. So far, casualties remain limited, but a further deployment of forces and heavy weaponry, an increased use of air power and direct or indirect external military intervention could precipitate a humanitarian disaster.

Despite the LNA’s military might and external support, its victory in Tripoli is not a foregone conclusion. The LNA could succeed in taking Tripoli without much of a fight if hostile forces turn sides or flee, as they have done in the centre and south. For now, however, this is an uncertain prospect as the two military coalitions appear equally matched. A more probable outcome is for the current escalation to turn into a protracted battle and possibly a prolonged siege of Tripoli, with a mounting civilian toll. And it could spread to other parts of the country, as Misratan forces have explicitly stated they intend to cut off LNA supply lines in central Libya, and have intimated that they may even go on a more far-reaching counter-attack.

What happens in the fight for Tripoli is now largely dependent on how outside actors respond. A number of external powers, including the U.S., UK, France, Italy, the UAE, Egypt and Russia, have condemned the escalation, calling on all parties to exercise restraint and either freeze military operations or withdraw to their prior locations. But none of these statements included the threat of sanctions and none made explicit mention of the need to support the UN-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli. To many Libyans this suggests that foreign governments are tacitly backing Haftar in his ambition to seize the capital and power.

While some of the LNA’s backers, such as the UAE and Egypt, appear to have attempted to rein in Haftar over the past three months, they may leap to his aid if he suffers military setbacks now that his forces stand at the gates of the capital. (Even as Egyptian diplomats were counselling restraint, heavy artillery and surface-to-air rockets were reportedly finding their way across the Egyptian border into Libya.) Should that happen, other foreign powers may jump into the fray on behalf of the Tripoli government, including Qatar and Turkey. Meanwhile, Russia blocked a UK-initiated UN Security Council statement condemning Haftar’s military offensive, insisting it call on all sides to exercise restraint.

To prevent a bloodbath in Tripoli and a dangerous escalation involving regional powers, Libya’s international partners should take urgent steps to avoid the current escalation from turning into a major destructive battle for the capital:

• Members of the UN Security Council should call for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and impose sanctions on political leaders and military commanders seeking to escalate further instead of standing down;
   
• Regional powers should refrain from militarily backing the offensive, and reaffirm their support for UN-led negotiations;
   
• The U.S. should call on Arab capitals to refrain from fuelling the war, and redouble efforts to persuade both sides to accept a previously proposed compromise agreement that would see military command in the hands of a national security council.

In order to encourage both sides to accept a ceasefire and resume negotiations, the UN should consider proposing a new negotiating format to replace the defunct Haftar-Serraj deal brokered but never finalised in late February. New negotiations would need three components reflecting the three-tiered nature of the Libyan crisis:

• A political track, which should no longer be limited to a deal between Haftar and Serraj but include a wider range of political representatives from rival factions to ensure broader national buy-in;
   
• A military track, convening senior commanders from both sides, along the lines of the Egypt-led military dialogue that took place until mid-2018 to agree on new security arrangements for the capital;
   
• A financial track, bringing together representatives from Libya’s divided Central Bank in order to bridge the rift in the financial institutions that first emerged from the 2014 political government split and only has grown since. The ensuing banking crisis and financial crunch it provoked for the east-based government, which faces increasing difficulty in processing payments, may well have triggered the LNA’s move on Tripoli at this particular moment.

Libya’s transition has been marred by numerous setbacks, infighting and external interference over the past eight years. These have enabled violent non-state actors such as ISIS to gain a foothold. Those who support the LNA’s military offensive in Tripoli today in order to defeat parties they label terrorists are betting on a military solution, which they believe will stabilise the country. But such an outcome is far from guaranteed, and all should be aware that protracted deadly fighting would have tumultuous repercussions for Libya, its neighbours and Europe, too. The threat of terrorism could become a self-fulfilling prophecy as new jihadist and other radical groups emerge from the chaos and join the fighting. 

Whose side is Russia on in Libya?

https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/russia-libya-hifter-sarraj-mishri.html

22.03.2019

On March 17, Khaled al-Mishri, president of Libya's High Council of State (HCS), arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the Federal Council, Russia’s upper house of parliament, to discuss bilateral relations and ways to tackle Libya's ongoing political crisis. Mishri was received by Valentina Matvienko, speaker of the Russian council, and also held talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, special presidential envoy for the Middle East and Africa. The Foreign Ministry issued a press release in which it cited Russia's support for a conference of all the Libyan parties under the auspice of Ghassan Salamé, the UN secretary-general's special representative for Libya.

Lev Dengov, head of the Russian Contact Group on Libya at the Foreign Ministry and the State Duma, denied an assertion in the Libya Observer that Russia is supportive only of Gen. Khalifa Hifter, leader of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), head of the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and a longtime adversary of Mishri. “Russia favors any side that is capable of positively impacting Libyan developments,” Dengov said. “The environment in the country is replete with numerous opposing camps. … As for us, we are working to help Libya agree on a single policy and restore peace without intervention in its internal affairs.”

The visit by Mishri, as head of the Tripoli-based body charged with advising the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), should be considered evidence of Russia maintaining a balanced policy on Libya. It was reported in Al-Monitor in October that Moscow was shifting away from a strategy of maintaining equal distance between itself and Tripoli and Tobruk and instead developing closer ties to Hifter, a Tobruk ally. This was symbolized by Hifter's visit to the Russian capital last November, during which he had discussions with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, in the run-up to the Palermo conference on Libya that same month. Since that time, there had been no significant meetings between Russian officials and Hifter's Tripoli-based opponents. Thus, Mishri trip to Moscow should serve to demonstrate that Moscow remains flexible in its approach to resolving the Libyan conflict.

One should bear in mind that Mishri and Hifter are longstanding opponents. The Hifter-led HoR does not recognize the HCS's authority over it despite the council's mandate to that effect under the Libyan Political Agreement. Also, throughout most of Mishri's political career, he has been a member of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood Group and its affiliated Justice and Construction Party, while Hifter has opposed the Muslim Brotherhood and voiced his commitment to eradicating it in Libya. Mishri resigned from the Brotherhood in January, but has stated that he still respects the organization and defends its role in Libyan society. Of note, Russia has designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization within its borders.

Mishri’s Moscow visit comes amid successful operations by Hifter's LNA in the southwestern Fezzan region that allowed Tobruk to assume control over the oil fields at el-Fil and el-Sharara, the largest in western Libya. The LNA has also gained sway over the strategic junctions of the trans-Saharan trade routes of al-Ghat, Murzuq and Sabha. The operation has significantly bolstered Hifter’s position on the ground and has also boosted his political standing, an outcome he had sought from the Abu Dhabi talks in late February when he met Fayez al-Sarraj, prime minister of the GNA and chair of the Presidential Council.

Meanwhile, the Military Council of Misrata, one of the largest military factions in western Libya, has rejected agreements reached in talks thus far between Sarraj and Hifter, and supporters of Libya's grand mufti, Sadiq al-Ghariani, have taken to the streets to protest against Sarraj. At the same time, Hifter has stepped up preparations for an offensive against Tripoli.

Amid these developments, Mishri traveled to Doha in early March to secure Qatari backing for Tripoli. Sarraj had preceded him with a visit of his own. While in Moscow, Mishri had sought certain assurances about red lines for a Hifter offensive on Tripoli, which might follow the general’s successful campaign in Fezzan. Russian diplomatic sources indicate that Cairo and Abu Dhabi may have given Hifter a green light for a Tripoli operation. It had been Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to which Mishri was referring in Moscow when he at one point cited “external interference” as the main impediment to resolving the Libyan conflict.

A campaign against Tripoli could trigger unpredictable consequences despite Hifter’s recent successes, including the country relapsing into a new protracted civil war, a “war of all against all,” as in 2014, with unclear prospects. The United States has already set a red line for Hifter, deeming the military campaign against Tripoli unacceptable, according to Western diplomats.

Although Russia expects a payoff from backing Hifter, Moscow's support has been palpably limited. Moscow is wary that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France will reap the most gains from Hifter acquiring a significantly strong position in Libya since they have bet on him alone and have invested much more in his success than Russia has. In turn, Russia would certainly benefit from maintaining a balanced position in Libya. In this way, Moscow could exploit the ties it has managed to preserve with all the parties to the conflict more effectively. This refers to the smaller actors as well as to Tripoli and Tobruk.

Mishri’s visit to Moscow had an economic component as well involving Mishri and Libya's parallel central banks.

Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya-focused research fellow at the Hague-based Clingendael Institute, provided backdrop to Al-Monitor, noting, “When the country almost split in 2014, the [central bank] governor — one of Libya’s most powerful officials — stayed in Tripoli and refused to follow the anti-Islamist camp in the east. As a result of this perceived loyalty to the Muslim Brothers and the city of Misrata, the eastern faction has been determined to sack [Governor] Sadiq al-Kabir.” 

Harchaoui further stated, “A year ago, Mishri began his tenure as the new head of the High Council of State and de-facto representative of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. As such, he discussed in detail with the eastern Libyan camp the potential removal of Kabir. The idea broached last year was a quid pro quo with the eastern faction: the High Council of State would have allowed Kabir’s removal, and in return, the east would have accepted a Brotherhood-leaning deputy as the new central bank governor. The east refused. The deal fell through.”

As for Russian involvement, Harchaoui said, “When it comes to the Central Bank conflict in Libya, Russia has been against Tripoli and in favor of Hiftar since 2016.” He noted, “In 2016, Moscow delivered 4 billion dinars ($3 billion) worth of banknotes to Hiftar’s camp. In total since 2016 Russia, has delivered 10 billion dinars ($7.5 billion) to Hifter.”

The Libya Observer reported that on the issue of Russia printing money for Tobruk's central bank, Mishri had told Bogdanov that Moscow “should break relations with parallel institutions in eastern Libya given the damage inflicted on Libya's economy by printing dinar banknotes in Russia.”

Kirill Semenov is an independent analyst with a yearslong record of professional study of political and military situations in the Middle East with a strong focus on conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya. He is also a non-resident expert of the Russian International Affairs Council

Russian mercenaries back Libyan rebel leader as Moscow seeks influence in Africa

By Alec Luhn, Moscow 

Dominic Nicholls, defence and security correspondent 

3 MARCH 2019 

Hundreds of mercenaries linked to Russian military intelligence have been backing the rebel commander of Libya's breakaway eastern half, The Telegraph has learned, as Moscow further expands its presence in Africa. 

The murky private military company Wagner Group has been supporting Khalifa Haftar with 300 personnel in Benghazi and has supplied his Libyan National Army with artillery, tanks, drones and ammunition, a Whitehall source said. 

A source close to the Libyan Russian Oil & Gas Joint Company started in Benghazi in April told The Telegraph that “lots of Wagner fighters went [to Libya], and there are rumours that military personnel also went there”. 

The illegal contractors are “almost interchangeable with the GRU,” whose agents are accused of poisoning Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, the Whitehall source said.

“They are trying to secure the deep-water ports of Tobruk and Derna for the Russian Fleet” and also “could control the flow of oil to southern Europe” if they take over Libya's energy industry, the source added.

Haftar's Libyan National Army has been seizing oilfields in a campaign that began in January. On Thursday, Haftar and the head of the internationally backed government based in Tripoli agreed in talks on the need to hold elections, although no date for the vote has been set.

The Wagner Group is linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, a restaurant and catering magnate known as “Putin's chef” who was sanctioned by the United States after his online troll factory interfered in the 2016 election. It previously fought alongside Kremlin allies in eastern Ukraine and Syria. 

Prigozhin was filmed sitting at a table with Haftar and Russia's defence minister during talks in November. Flight tracking data showed a private jet linked to Prigozhin repeatedly came on the radar heading to or from Libyan airspace, most recently in January.

Yevgeny Shabayev, a Cossack activist with ties to mercenaries who has been campaigning to legalise private military companies in Russia, claimed that he had been told by security officials that Wagner fighters were operating in Libya. He alleged that they were involved in drug and people smuggling.

Reuters reported in January that Wagner contractors were guarding Venezuela's embattled president Nicolas Maduro. Ahead of protests called for Monday, Russian air force Il-62 passenger plane flew to Venezuela on Saturday and left the next day, according to flight tracking records.

The Russian defence ministry did not respond to requests for comment. Prigozhin's Concord holding replied to questions with an email of absurdities claiming that Wagner was actually supporting Haftar from Marie Byrd Land in Antarctica. 

The news of Wagner's involvement in Libya corresponds with Russia's push to increase influence in Africa through an arsenal ranging from arms and energy deals to covert military and political support. 

“Putin's chef” is in charge of the darker side of this nexus, running shadowy operations that have furthered Russian commercial and political interests without any official connection to the Kremlin. His mercenaries have also been working in the war-torn Central African Republic and Sudan, two Russian military contractors told The Telegraph.

In addition, The Telegraph has uncovered evidence that Russian military contractors were in Madagascar and that Prigozhin had sent political consultants to help elect Emmerson Mnangagwa president of Zimbabwe last August. 

Mr Mnangagwa dispatched envoys to Moscow in the months before and after the vote and came himself to meet Vladimir Putin in January, inking a deal to develop platinum deposits with a firm run by the son of a top Russian official.

Zimbabwe opposition politicians had claimed that Russia interfered in the election and supposedly even flew pre-marked ballots to Harare, allegations that Mr Mnangagwa denied. 

But in a recording heard by The Telegraph, a geologist connected to Prigozhin said Russian political consultants had “deployed” to Zimbabwe during the election. The Telegraph independently confirmed the man was a geologist who had worked in Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic, Madagascar and several other African countries in recent years.

The geologist tied the consultants' presence to what he said were attempts by Prigozhin to get involved in mineral extraction in Zimbabwe.

He also said there was a Russian “armed presence” in Madagascar related to unrest near an oil drilling site.

It was previously reported that political consultants linked to Prigozhin were involved in last year's presidential election in Madagascar.

A Russian entrepreneur who has worked in Zimbabwe said the Moscow-based political consultancy Image Contact was involved in the Zimbabwe election. 

A source close to the company said its head knew Prigozhin and had provided consultants to clients interested in resource extraction in Africa. The idea, the source said, was for the consultants help get a local politician elected, then become advisors to the leader and help their client obtain contracts. 

Image Contact declined to comment, as did Russian and Zimbabwean officials involved in Mr Mnangagwa's visit to Moscow.

The foreign ministry also did not answer a question about Russian involvement in the vote, but said Russian companies were seeking natural resource projects there.

The ministry said last year 150 private and five military instructors from Russia were training army and security troops in CAR as part of a United Nations arms embargo exemption given to Moscow to support government forces. 

But it is believed that Wagner mercenaries are operating on both sides of the lines after a plane with Russian military advisors and a Russian arms convoy were filmed in rebel territory. 

The Prigozhin-linked geologist said Russian “military contractors are guarding our diamond or gold mines” in CAR. A company reportedly controlled by Prigozhin has been involved in Russia-CAR joint mining ventures and even funded soft-power initiatives like a radio station and beauty contest. 

A January investigation tied the ambush and murder of three Russian journalists reporting on Wagner in CAR to the local president's Russian security advisor, who previously worked for companies belonging to Prigozhin. Russians have also been photographed guarding the president.

Wagner fighters are also believed to have helped dictator Omar Bashir brutally put down opposition protests in Sudan after white men in Russian-made military trucks were photographed near the demonstrations. 

Moscow later admitted that Russian military instructors from both “private and state structures” were operating in Sudan. 

A “Russian private military company” has been training forces in Sudan since at least December 2017, a video posted by a pro-Kremlin reporter at the time revealed. 

Ruslan Leviev of the Conflict Intelligence Team, which tracks Russian military activity through open source information, said Prigozhin's mercenaries, consultants and mining companies in Africa are all instruments of Kremlin foreign policy. 

“When you have both fighting forces and economic influence in a country … you can affect the internal situation,” he said. “[Prigozhin's] economic activities serve this end because his businesses in Syria and Africa are not even comparable to what he has in Russia.”

Flight records placing the Prigozhin-linked private jet in Sudan, Kenya and Chad suggest that he may be active in these places as well.

Oleg Krinitsyn, head of RSB Group, a Moscow-based security company that de-mined a cement factory in Libya in 2016, said Russian military contractors can't work in Africa without the support of the Russian authorities. 

African governments are interested, he said. RSB Group has worked in countries including Madagascar, Somalia, Mozambique and South Africa and had received offers to work in Sudan. Russian citizenship is now “like a password” to work across the continent, Krinitsyn said.

Flying into Nigeria recently, he recalled, the migration officers were hassling British travellers but welcomed him with the words “Putin, vodka, Kalashnikov good, welcome my friend”. 

Mr Putin will show off his political pivot to Africa at an economic summit for African leaders in Sochi in October. 

“For years we bombed our country's leadership with letters and they pushed us away,” said Irina Abramova, head of the Russian Academy of Sciences Africa Institute. “It feels like our task has been achieved and Russia has turned toward Africa.”

Additional reporting by Anastasia Mikhailova

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/03/03/russian-mercenaries-back-libyan-rebel-leader-moscow-seeks-influence/?WT.mc_id=tmg_share_tw