Are Libyans abandoning democracy in search of stability?

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/libya-abandoning-democracy-search-stability.html#ixzz4NBbzixya

10.10

Mohamed ELJARH

It has been nearly five years since Libyan leader Col. Moammar Gadhafi was captured and killed by Libyan rebels near his hometown of Sirte on Oct. 20, 2011. Sadly, Libya remains a deeply divided country, both politically and institutionally, and does not have a functional representative government in place. Tragically, Libya’s democratic transition process failed to create an environment conducive for democracy and the rule of law. Instead, Libya became a country where militias ruled, extremist groups flourished and living conditions deteriorated significantly. The country also suffers from a major political crisis, with various competing governments each claiming legitimacy and control over key institutions such as the Central Bank, the National Oil Corporation and the Libyan Investment Authority.

Today, Libyans are forced to choose between two extremes: either chaos with militias and Islamist extremists as the dominant forces, or military rule. No other convincing options are on offer. The choice is quite clear in Libya’s eastern region of Cyrenaica (Barqa in Arabic), where the military is now the dominant armed and political force on the ground, expanding its control over democratically elected and civilian institutions without any public opposition and with clear public support for their actions. On June 19, the president of the Libyan parliament in Tobruk, in his claimed capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces, declared a state of emergency and appointed the Libyan National Army Chief of Staff Abdulrazaq Nadori as military governor for the eastern region. Nadori now has the power to appoint civilian and military committees and can replace local municipal councils with military governors. He also can prohibit demonstrations that do not have prior written consent from his office.

In Libya’s eastern region, Nadori started a campaign to replace largely dysfunctional but democratically elected municipal councils with military-appointed governors. The step represents yet another setback for democracy in post-Gadhafi Libya. So far, military governors have replaced eight municipal councils, including those in the cities of Benghazi, Shahaat, Ejdabyia in the northeast and Kufrah in the southeast. 

Otman Gajiji, the chairman of the Central Committee of Municipal Elections of Libya, expressed great concern over what he called the “military takeover” of democratically elected authorities. “There is no legal framework or justification for these appointments,” he told Al-Monitor.

Indeed, there is no existing legislation or emergency law in place to legally justify Nadori’s actions. It is also clear that there is no accountability mechanism for oversight from the parliament in Tobruk.

However, such concerns do not seem to be shared by the head of Libya’s parliament, who authorized Nadori’s actions. Also, the mayor of Tobruk in eastern Libya requested that the military appoint a governor for the city, citing a lack of resources and city officials' inability to provide services and fight crime. Similarly, local community leaders in the municipality of Soloug south of Benghazi demanded that the military appoint a governor for the municipality. Local communities in the southern and western regions of Libya are discussing the idea of military governors for their own municipalities, showing the potential for the militarization trend to spread nationwide.

To understand this shift in Libya’s political and governance landscape, one must look into the dynamics that gave rise to this trend and also local perspectives about it. Activists in the city of Benghazi, the first to have its municipal council replaced with a military governor, told Al-Monitor that many civil society and democracy activists were strong supporters of the army’s war on extremist Islamist militias in Benghazi. The activists explained their support by pointing out that since 2012, Benghazi has witnessed a terror campaign at the hands of extremists in which more than 500 civil society activists, politicians, journalists and military and security personnel have been killed. Most of these cases were perpetrated by “unknown assailants,” with successive governments failing to bring those responsible to justice. Furthermore, the security situation and living conditions have deteriorated significantly. The Libyan National Army and its leader, Gen. Khalifa Hifter, capitalized on these failures.

Residents of Benghazi and other major cities in eastern Libya celebrate the Libyan National Army’s advances and gains in Benghazi. Younes Najm, an activist from Benghazi, said the Libyan National Army "has recognition in the eyes of the people because it was the only institution that dealt with people’s concerns over the rise of extremist groups, militias and the deteriorating security situation.” Indeed, under the Libyan National Army, security has improved and criminal activities are being addressed, garbage collection seems to be working and there is better control over the prices of goods and services. All of these are quick wins that were badly needed and that previous governments failed to deliver. Undoubtedly, all this gives the military more public legitimacy than democratically elected but dysfunctional institutions.

“This is not what we had hoped for Libya, but Libya’s chance to establish a democracy has been sabotaged by narrow-minded interests and hijacked by Islamist groups with a transitional agenda,” said Monem Alyaser, who served in the General National Congress, the 2012-2014 transitional legislature. “Somehow, we will have to start over by establishing stability and building democratic institutions capable of upholding the rule of law and protecting human rights,” he added.

Despite the threats, challenges and the long road ahead, civil society activists and democracy advocates in Libya should be ready to push against the militarization exercise unfolding in the country in a way that does not help extremists or their enablers but rather defends the principles of rule of law, human rights and democracy.

The Hifter effect on the battle for Libya's Sirte

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/libya-battle-sirte-isis-general-hifter.html#ixzz4NBZFRcjX

14.10

JASON PACK

For months now, the ouster of Islamic State (IS) forces from Libya’s coastal city of Sirte has been touted as imminent, yet like the light at the end of the tunnel that is within sight but out of grasp, complete victory against IS continues to evade the Misratan-led, Bunyan al-Marsus (BM) forces, and their US allies.

There is still little doubt that a victory of some sort will be eventually won. In fact, before President Barack Obama leaves office, the United States may be able to claim that its aerial and training support have proved instrumental in ousting IS from Sirte. However, without a unified political solution in place through which Sirte’s battered infrastructure, public services and civilian way of life can be restored post-IS, any such victory may turn out to be very superficial. IS emerged in Sirte out of a Misratan occupation following the defeat of an al-Qaeda-linked jihadi group, Ansar al-Sharia, in 2013. The post-conflict stabilization was botched and both civilians in Sirte and Ansar al-Sharia fighters chafed under the Misratan yoke, the latter defecting wholesale to IS in 2015.

Is Sirte closer to being liberated?

IS forces are currently entrenched within the third residential area in northeast Sirte, and despite their limited numbers, the remaining IS fighters continue to inflict casualties on their Misratan opponents through sniper fire and explosive devices. On Oct. 7, BM forces, who are nominally aligned with the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA), launched a fresh assault, which culminated in splitting the enclave. A BM media official, Ali al-Mabrouk, said, "The forces of Bunyan al-Marsus made some advances and completely [cut off] the 600-block area in Sirte." Nevertheless, at least 8 BM fighters were killed in this latest advance, while IS fighters still appear able to conduct attacks outside of their stronghold; on Oct. 2, a Dutch photojournalist was killed by sniper fire in an area of Sirte already supposedly "liberated" from IS forces. Furthermore, reports of fighting between BM forces and jihadis south of Sirte in recent weeks seems to confirm fears that IS fighters have been able to seep out of Sirte, and may therefore be able to regroup or assimilate into other jihadi groups elsewhere.

Have US airstrikes really helped?

The United States has conducted 210 sorties since Aug. 1, when it launched Operation Odyssey Lightning — its campaign of airstrikes in support of BM forces fighting IS in Sirte — and has twice exceeded its planned time frame with operations now entering their third month. The low levels of ordinance dropped and the need for such extensions speak volumes about the ineffective military phasing of this operation. Airstrikes should have been used to soften up IS positions long before BM fighters had begun the urban warfare that has turned IS into a guerrilla enemy. This approach was not adopted because the GNA only requested US assistance after its own forces got bogged down. It should come as no surprise then that the Misratan Military Council — which is coordinating military efforts on the ground in Sirte — has indicated its discontent with the US air support, calling it ineffective.

Due to this incorrect phasing, airstrikes may not have lowered allied casualties or accelerated the battle’s time frame. Since the assault on IS in Sirte began in May, Misrata has suffered heavy losses for a city of only 500,000 inhabitants — at least 560 BM fighters have been killed and 2,750 injured. Rifts and tensions within Misrata have magnified and Misrata’s role as Libya’s most powerful city-state has diminished.

As Misrata gains a Pyrrhic victory, Hifter rises

While the Sirte campaign has dragged on in the east, Khalifa Hifter, the commander of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), has steadily been amassing power and territory through his militarization of the governance of much of eastern Libya, which now extends to within 50 kilometers (31 miles) of Sirte. On Sept. 11, he seized the oil crescent ports from the federalists, allowing the resumption of much-needed crude exports, and firmly tipping the country’s balance of power in his direction.

Hifter’s actual victory in the oil crescent has pre-empted and overshadowed Misrata’s anticipated victory in Sirte, shifting power away from the GNA and western Libya, toward Hifter in the east. Oil production has reached 554,000 barrels per day and its continued flow is essential to stymie OPEC attempts to cut production and raise prices. These new realities on the ground mean that Hifter now has greater leverage within the international community as well as with many towns, tribes and militias on the ground. It is too early to say what impact this will have in the ongoing fight against jihadism in Libya.

De-facto separation?

On the one hand, given that there is no longer a third force separating the LNA and Misratan forces — a role the federalists and IS had previously occupied — and that both Misrata and the LNA are fighting IS and other jihadi groups, albeit in different locations, this could theoretically strengthen the logic of partition and tacit compromise between eastern and western Libya in the event of the collapse of the UN-mediated peace process. Indeed, there are likely to be many battle-weary Misratan fighters who are willing to tacitly accept Hifter’s gains so long as the LNA does not advance further west or tries to keep oil revenues for themselves. That said, although Hifter's influence is strong in eastern Libya, he is struggling to exert his control over his allies elsewhere, with LNA units in both southern and western Libya rebelling against his rule in recent days. Although a rebellion by ex-Moammar Gadhafi regime commanders in Sebha was quashed last week, this shows that Hifter does not yet have the power or influence to take the rest of Libya by force.

On the other hand, anti-Hifter sentiment remains sky high and is already fueling a backlash that could stimulate further jihadi recruitment. Islamist hard-liners from across Libya appear to be rallying their forces to Tripoli, fearful that current negotiations with Hifter will lead to him being given a security role within the UN-mediated political process. Kidnappings and assassinations between pro-GNA and Islamist militias in Tripoli have been on the rise in recent weeks, and if a new "grand bargain" is struck that reflects Hifter’s power on the ground, it is highly likely that these anti-Hifter hard-line Islamists will respond with violence, possibly spawning a newly rebranded jihadi network.

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/libya-battle-sirte-isis-general-hifter.html#ixzz4NBZhH78q

GNC and HoR to announce unity government

14.10

The former head of the National Salvation Government, in Tripoli, Khalifa Al-Ghuwel, and some members of the General National Congress (GNC), including the deputy head, Awad Abdul-Qader, as well as security officers convened, Friday evening, in Tripoli.

The meeting was held in the headquarter of the GNC in hospitality palaces in Tripoli, to agree on forming a national unity government under the leadership of Mohamed Boker.

According to close source in Tripoli, the sides of the agreement would include the head of the House of Representatives (HoR), Ageela Saleh, Khalifa Al-Ghuwel, the head of the GNC, the head of the Interim Government, Abdulla Al-Thinni, and Nuri Abusahmain. The agreement would be provided to the HoR to endorse it.

The source said that the two deputies of Boker would be Al-Ghuwel and Al-Thinni. The proposed government will start working in all of the areas in Libya. The meeting is expected to announce a statement, Sunday night.

The Presidential Council (PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA) hasn’t commented on the matter.

http://libyaprospect.com/index.php/2016/10/14/breaking-news-gnc-and-hor-to-announce-unity-government/

Militiaman who became Libya’s oil kingpin

Eastern militiaman’s support for the central government could end Eastern militiaman’s support for the central government could end the conflict.

By  ADAM NATHAN 

25.08

RA’S LANUF, Libya — Ibrahim Jadhran has gone from an alleged car thief imprisoned in Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s most notorious prison to a warlord in charge of a powerful militia sitting on billions of dollars of oil money.

Now he’s one of the most important players in an effort to end the chaos that has torn Libya apart since Qadhafi’s overthrow in 2011: He has thrown his weight behind the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), signing a breakthrough deal to reopen Libya’s oil ports.

Jadhran is the chief of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), a militia force of more than 20,000 men that is supposed to protect the country’s vital oil industry. Speaking in the large boardroom of his office complex in the deep-water port of Ra’s Lanuf, in the oil crescent of central Libya, he spelt out his supposed conversion.

“I am a Muslim but I consider myself a moderate,” said Jadhran, who had shed his normal military uniform for a dark suit. “And it is because of that I chose the middle … The area where we sit now is in the middle of Libya. It is my country’s security valve and it is the beating heart of Libya’s wealth.”

His voice matters both because of the men and the money he controls. Jadhran has been an extremely skillful player in the turmoil of post-Qadhafi Libya as militias, tribes and rival governments — an internationally recognized one in the eastern city of Tobruk, and a more Islamist one called the General National Congress (GNC) based in the capital Tripoli in the west — battled for control.

In mid-2013, Jadhran closed two major oil export terminals, demanding the GNC government give eastern Libya more autonomy, particularly over oil revenues, and branded the former management of the National Oil Company corrupt.

His brand of maverick separatism increased and, in March 2014, he allowed an oil tanker named the Morning Glory to set sail from the eastern port of Sidra under the North Korean flag. It was promptly stopped and boarded by the U.S. Navy.

Jadhran claims the Morning Glory crude oil shipment had been authorized by the Tobruk government, but the Tripoli government tried to stop the tanker, and the incident led to the ousting of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan.

Jadhran is also critical of the eastern legislature in Tobruk, which he claimed was seeking a military dictatorship under General Khalifa Haftar, who led an assault on the GNC government and remains a powerful warlord.

“We stood by the government, but at the time the National Congress started to lean toward the Islamists and then the parliament [House of Representatives in Tobruk] leaned towards the militarization of the state and the return of a dictatorship. So we saw that we were the only ones standing in the middle,” said Jadhran.

Jadhran supported a national political dialogue and it was this process that led to the December formation of the new U.N.-backed government in Tripoli. “We released a statement of support three hours after the GNA was formed despite the fact it was almost political suicide to support its newly-born presidential council,” he said.

Call to arms

Others point out that Jadhran’s loyalty to the GNA came at a price, the payment of his 20,000 plus PFG forces of all their back salaries.

Mattia Toaldo, policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, is critical of what he called Jadhran’s “opportunistic choices” but is pragmatic about his importance to Libya’s political future.

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“Jadhran remains in the eyes of many Libyans a very controversial figure,” he said. “Yet, the truth is that along with Defence Minister Mahdi Al-Barghathi, he’s the only easterner who supported the GNA from day one and the GNA needs not just the oil he sits on but his loyalty.”

That support for a new and internationally recognized government, complete with a signing ceremony — attended by tribal leaders — to reopen the ports is something of a change for Jadhran. He’s been embroiled in his country’s violent politics since the war that ousted Qadhafi.

The son of an army officer, the muscular 34-year-old had spent the previous six years in the notorious Abu Slim prison, where he was sent at 22 for a life sentence for what he says was his political activism, but which records suggest was for car theft. However, Qadhafi never called anyone a political prisoner and inmates were branded pretty thieves, traitors or spies.

“I was released three days after the spark of the February 17th revolution,” said Jadhran. “Because the demonstrators calling for change were met with live fire and mortars from the Qadhafi regime, peaceful protest was not possible and we were forced to take up arms. Young men found themselves forced to carry arms and return fire on an enemy.

He formed a battalion of volunteers to defend Libya’s oil crescent around Ra’s Lanuf and Ajdabiya, his hometown. “I managed to gather 16 battalions under the one flag, all of which participated in the revolution.”

In a deeply divided country, Jadhran defended Cyrenaica, the east of the country that has traditionally been hostile to the Tripoli-dominated west and slowly took over Libya’s oil infrastructure.

Now he controls the four main oil ports of Ra’s Lanuf, Zueitina, Sidra and Brega, many oil wells and hundreds of miles of pipelines and says that his goal is to protect the oil wealth that accounts for 97 percent of Libya’s economic output

His forces helped oust ISIL fighters from key oil terminals and in recent weeks have led assaults on key ISIL locations along Libya’s coast. He has also followed through on his promise to allow for renewed oil exports under a unified National Oil Company.

“The issue of selling and marketing oil is strictly the business of the National Oil Company, it has been entrusted to carry out this mission by the government and the people of Libya,” he said.

This week, the House of Representatives voted against the GNA in a no confidence motion. The vote means that Jadhran’s commitment to the GNA, together with his influence in the east and control over the security of oil exports, are even more vital to Libya’s future.

So the question is, what does Jadhran want? The answer seems to be political respectability and to present the PFG as an example of good governance to encourage investment back into Libya.

“There is no doubt that I have high expectations in assuming a high and honorable position and that this position should be for the good of the people,” said Jadhran. “If Libya becomes independent, its institutions secured within a real democratic and good governance blueprint, then this will enable international investment companies to re-enter Libya.”

http://www.politico.eu/article/ibrahim-jadhran-libya-separatist-gna-qadhafi/

 

8/25/16, 2:35 PM CET

A New Conflict in the East? Jadhran, Haftar, and the Battles over Benghazi, Tripoli, and Sirte

15.08

Paradoxically, the moment of the GNA’s approach closer towards victory against IS in Sirte is also a moment of a key defeat in its legitimacy. The political process in Libya remains derailed, and the UN-mediated Government of National Accord continues to lose legitimacy despite the successes achieved against IS in Sirte in its name. This observation was recognised by the UN envoy Martin Kobler in a recent interview, saying that popular support for the GNA is crumbling with much of the early support for the GNA evaporating due to worsening economic and security woes. What Kobler didn’t mention is that it is largely his failed implemenation of Leon’s flawed plan which has gotten us towards this point.  Kobler has shown a German dogmatism for sticking towards the letter of the law of the LPA without understand that it was meant to bring Libya’s key power blocs on board which it has failed to do.

A War between the LNA and the PFG in Zeuitina remains a high risk as the LNA is trying to bleed away support from Jadhran and undermine GNA influence in the East.

Politically the GNA is unlikely to receive any significant boost in legitimacy or governance effectiveness until a total victory is achieved by Banyan Marsus-affiliated Misratan forces in Sirte. However, this may make or break the GNA, as pro- and anti-GNA factions (especially hard-line Islamists) begin to jostle already in the capital to position themselves to take advantage of the outcome.

After Sirte is declared liberated, serious rifts within GNA-affiliated militias are highly likely, between those supporting a full attack against Haftar, and those wishing to oust Islamist militias from Tripoli. Although it ought to be a boost for the GNA to liberate Sirte, it is likely that the victorious militias will defy GNA rulings and expose the fact that the GNA is not actually a unity of anything.

http://www.libya-analysis.com/

Sirte Could be Just the Beginning for ISIS in Africa

15.08

Libyan forces have been making significant advancements against ISIS in Sirte as a result of support from the US who have led an airstrike campaign that began earlier this month.

ISIS has since been desperate to establish a new base, and there are reports that ISIS fighters have been escaping Sirte and heading towards other African countries. There have also been reports that suggest ISIS fighters have been heading south of Sirte to other Libyan cities and towns.

ISIS militants are also said to have gone towards the Libyan border between Algeria and Niger which are known to lack security. Officials say all neighbouring countries are on high alert in hopes of stopping the extremist group from spreading further.

A Western official monitoring the events in Sirte said, “these borders are so huge and they require a degree of professionalism that these countries do not have in order to monitor them.”

Western sources say hundreds of ISIS fighter made their way south weeks ago when the group was cornered in the centre of Sirte.

Western officials monitoring the events in Sirte claimed that most of the fighters are foreign. Many of them are Tunisian but there is also a number of fighters from sub-Saharan African countries, especially Sudan and Nigeria.

Tunisia’s air force has been ordered to stay on high alert in response to the threat of ISIS spreading to their country, said a Tunisian military officer.

Last year, Tunisia started building a wall and water trenches along its border with Libya, meanwhile, Algeria also took precautions by building a fence along its border with Libya and adding security guards at the border.

The Libyan militia groups fighting against ISIS in Sirte could not stop the flow of people fleeing Sirte which made it easier for ISIS to flee, said a Libyan military intelligence officer.

“There was almost 100 miles between us and Islamic State [in Sirte]. All that space was open desert for them to escape,” said the intelligence officer.

Instead of fleeing from Libya, some ISIS fighters might decide to stay in the country to take advantage of the chaos and lack of security.

Bani Walid, a Libyan city located between Tripoli and Misrata in the country’s southern region, is said to be in a vulnerable state and might be ISIS’s next target.

“In Sirte they told us ‘the Islamic State fighters are our sons’ and asked that we not harm them. Bani Walid will say the same, but when they start chopping off their heads, they will come to us begging for help,” said the intelligence official.

With two governments in Libya declaring their authority over the country, Libya finds itself in the same weak state it was in two years ago. The Government of National Accord (GNA) is based in Tripoli and is backed by the UN and the international community, whereas, the House of Representatives (HoR) is based in Benghazi and is backed by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

Recently, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called on all Libyan governments to unify and show their support to the Tripoli government.

https://www.libyangazette.net/2016/08/15/sirte-could-be-just-the-beginning-for-isis-in-africa/

Support for Libyan unity government 'crumbling': UN envoy

12.08

Martin Kobler warned that infrastructure problems, power outages and financial woes have eroded support for the Libyan unity government

Support for the UN-backed unity government in Libya is "crumbling" amid increased power outages and a weakening currency that is hitting crucial imports, the United Nations' envoy to the embattled north African country told a newspaper.

The Government of National Accord (GNA) has been struggling to impose its authority on a country riven by political and armed rivalries, posing extra challenges as it tries to quash Islamic State militants.

The UN point man for Libya, Martin Kobler, told Switzerland's Neue Zuercher Zeitung in an interview published on Friday there was no alternative to backing the GNA, but he acknowledged it had forfeited some of its initial popularity.

Asked about an earlier comment he made that 95 percent of Libyans backed GNA Prime Minister Fayez Seraj, he said: "That was in April. There was a lot of good will then for the unity government. It has lost some support in the meantime.

"At the time Tripoli had 20 hours of electricity a day, now it is 12 ... In April people had to pay 3.5 dinars for a dollar. Today it is five dinars. That is devastating for an import-oriented economy. Support is crumbling."

Kobler, a German career diplomat, said US air power could not win the fight against Islamic State in Libya, appealing for squabbling factions to support the GNA.

"Strikes by the Americans alone cannot defeat IS. The fight has to be a Libyan one. It will be won with ground troops," he said.

Blow to IS in Sirte

Pro-government forces battled on Thursday to clear IS from its main Libyan stronghold of Sirte, after dealing a major blow to the group by seizing their headquarters.

IS fighters still control several areas of the Mediterranean city, whose capture in June last year sparked fears that the group would use it as a springboard for attacks on Europe.

The fall of Sirte would be a huge setback to IS efforts to expand their self-proclaimed "caliphate" beyond Syria and Iraq where they have also suffered a string of losses.

Forces loyal to Libya's UN-backed unity government made a significant breakthrough on Wednesday in their nearly three-month-old offensive to retake the city, seizing a conference centre where IS had set up a base.

"The battle for Sirte has reached its final phase, after the successful offensive by our heroes," a spokesman for the forces, General Mohamad Ghassri, said on Thursday in remarks carried by the LANA news agency.

The rapid advance comes after the United States launched air strikes on IS positions in the city for the first time on 1 August.

IS took advantage of the chaos that followed the death of longtime Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 to gain a foothold in the country.

The forces loyal to the GNA on Wednesday also seized the University of Sirte campus just south of the Ouagadougou conference centre as well as the Ibn Sina Hospital to the north.

Libyan television stations broadcast images of flag-waving soldiers in recaptured areas including the Ouagadougou centre, flashing victory signs as they posed for photographs.

The pro-GNA forces said 16 of their fighters were killed and dozens wounded on Wednesday in the fighting in Sirte.

The GNA said that at least 20 militants had died in fighting for the university campus.

In total more than 300 pro-government fighters have been killed and 1,800 wounded in the operation for Sirte, according to medical sources in the city of Misrata, where the operation's command centre in based.

Kidnapped Egyptians freed

Twenty-three Egyptian workers kidnapped in Libya were freed and returned to their country on Friday, Egyptian state television reported.

One of the freed Egyptians told state television they had been kidnapped by people demanding ransom, in an interview at a border crossing between the neighbouring North African countries.

State television reported they were freed by "Libyan special forces in coordination with the Egyptian general intelligence service".

It aired footage of the workers arriving at the border crossing, waving Egyptian flags and prostrating themselves to God in gratitude.

They were kidnapped near the oil town of Brega and held hostage for 10 days, one of them said.

Thousands of Egyptians brave the unrest in Libya for employment despite government warnings to avoid the war-torn country.

In 2015, the Islamic State group's affiliate in Libya announced it had kidnapped and beheaded 21 Coptic Christians, most of them Egyptian.

http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/support-libyan-unity-government-crumbling-un-envoy-315965517

The countdown of Haftar phenomenon

16.08

The militarily and politically events accelerated after the US President Barak Obama announced his decision earlier this month to support the Government of National Accord (GNA) militarily, through organized airstrikes against the Islamic State (IS) in the city of Sirte. Both political and military events have escalated.

The Arabic newspaper, Al-Quds Alaraby, said in its opinion, and LIBYAPROSPECT translates here, that in a report published by the Washington Post, a Libyan military source confirmed that the US intervention is not limited to air strikes, but also includes the presence of Special Operations troops “Commandos” providing on-the-ground support to the GNA.

In another occurrence, which is of great significance, Libyan military sources revealed that the French Special Forces supported the House of Representatives (HoR) Army, led by General Khalifa Haftar, withdrew from Benghazi a few days ago. Sources suggest that the troops are headed towards a US military base close to Malta. The French military presence was criticized heavily by the GNA and considered it a “blatant interference,” which resulted in the summoning of the French ambassador in Tripoli, who made an appearance after the death of three soldiers in a helicopter crash in Benghazi.

In a statement issued by six Western governments (US, France, Italy, UK, Germany, and Spain), the GNA has been called upon to take control of all power plants in Libya, which is the general opinion that the Libyan public is leaning towards, upon tensions, over which group is authorised to manage Al-Zwetina Oil Port, whether it is the government’s army or the oil installations’ guard. Haftar’s statements played a significant role in destabilizing the situation.

The US’s decision came after an extended period of hesitation. Reactions from western nations seem to be for the US’s raids on Sirte, especially after France’s ‘efforts’ in supporting the power-hungry Khalifa Haftar, an act that controverts entirely with the International Community’s (both Arab and Western) consent on the GNA.

The silence is dominating Haftar’s regional supporters, in particular, Egypt, was broken when Cairo announced their support to the US’s military raids on the Islamic State (IS) in Sirte. Regardless Cairo’s position being a formality or diplomatically motivated; it proves Cairo’s inability to defy the US’s western-backed decision.

Egypt’s ability to play the Haftar card to halt the return of a centralized Libyan government has weakened, due to the political, economic and social problems that Egypt is currently facing. Upon the Gulf’s decision to cut off their funding, Egypt finds itself in a position to seek aid from the International Monetary Fund regardless of the social and economic costs of this decision.

The only objection came from the Russian capital Moscow. However, this rejection can be reflected through the “Veto Weapon” in the UN’s Security Council, as was the case in regards to Yemen. Unfortunately, for the Russians, this will not delay the ongoing events in Libya, simply because they do not have the tools necessary on Libyan soil.

To be fair to the GNA, the seriousness of this government’s use of political and military resources to combat the IS, which cost them hundreds of casualties and injuries, at a time when Haftar was busy growing his publicity, had everything to do with the current evolving events.

The end of Haftar’s validity and his affiliates in some Arab countries will be a joyous occasion, a countdown to communities’ ability to reject extremism and to create genuine political compromises.

http://libyaprospect.com/index.php/2016/08/16/the-countdown-of-haftar-phenomenon/

Libya’s Intelligence refutes Corriere della Sera’s claims that Italy paid €13m to free Italians from Sabratha

16.08

The Head of the Libyan Intelligence Department in the capital, Tripoli, Mustafa Noah, has declined the allegations of the Italian corriere della sera newspaper that Italy ransomed the Italian hostages out of Libya with a sum worth 13 million euros.

“Libyan intelligence affirmed it was involved in a deal that saw Italian authorities paying ransom of 13 million euros to rescue the four Italian hostages out of Libya.” Corriere della sera wrote on Monday.

However, Noah refuted this report by the Italian newspaper and said in a press statement that saving the hostages was done by an intelligence operation in Libya.

Four Italian nationals who work in Milletah Oil and Gas Company were kidnapped by the IS militants back in 2015 nearby Sabratha city to the west of Tripoli. When freed by a security force from Sabratha in March 2016, two were alive and the other two were killed by IS terrorists.

It is worth mentioning that Sabratha city has seen violent clashes between the city’s security units and the IS militants who were positioned in secret cells in there. Those clashes – coupled with a US airstrike – helped eradicate them from the city and leave a huge number of them either dead or wounded.

http://www.libyanexpress.com/libyas-intelligence-refutes-corriere-della-seras-claims-that-italy-paid-e13m-to-free-italians-from-sabratha/

Libyan intelligence chief denies Italy paid ransom to release Italian hostages in Libya

16.08

Head of Libya’s intelligence service Mustafa Nouh on Monday denied a media report from Italy’sCorriere della Sera newspaper earlier on Sunday claiming the Italian government had paid a ransom of 13 million euros to free two Italians abducted by Daesh in Libya.

Nouh described the report as “groundless” in a statement.

“The two hostages were freed as a result of a [security] operation,” he said.

Nouh praised the cooperation between the Italian intelligence and the general intelligence service in Tripoli, stressing that the continuation of this cooperation will have a positive impact on the fight against terrorism in Libya and Europe in general.

Militants affiliated with Daesh abducted four Italians last year near an oil and gas plant outside Libya’s north-western city of Sabratha, located some 50 miles west of Tripoli.

Two of the hostages were later freed by Libyan security forces, while the remaining two were killed by militants.

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160816-libyan-intelligence-chief-denies-italy-paid-ransom-to-release-italian-hostages-in-libya/

US airstrikes hit IS in Libya, marking 48 strikes in August

16.08

Airstrikes launched by the United States have hit an Islamic State group vehicle and four militant positions in Libya, raising to 48 the number of U.S. airstrikes against the extremist group since Washington launched its anti-IS campaign in Libya on Aug. 1.

In a statement Tuesday, U.S. Africa Command says it conducted the strikes in the coastal city of Sirte “at the request of, and in coordination with,” Libya’s United Nations-backed government.

Sirte is the Islamic State group’s last remaining stronghold in the country, and Libyan troops have been forcing the militants into ever-smaller bits of territory there, backed by the U.S. airstrikes.

The U.S. says the bombing campaign is critical to protecting U.S. national security interests, by denying IS a safe haven in Libya.

THE ANTI-ISIS COALITION

09.08

A shared military front has not materialized and is unlikely to materialize, because ISIS’s opponents have never made a coherent political coalition against it. At the time of writing (early August 2016), divisions between Haftar’s LNA, the GNA’s Banyan Marsus, and Ibrahim Jadhran’s Petroleum Facilities Gaurds have never been greater.

Conflict between the LNA and Jadhran’s PFG is imminent in the coming days and weeks, especially at Zeuitina. However, since 3 August, the LNA’s (153) Desert forces led by Col. Muftah Shagluf has been mobilising forces to positions in Al Shurb, 10 km east of Zeuitina port. The move has provoked a strong reaction from the PFG, whose spokesperson Ali Al-Hassi threatened that any attack by the LNA ‘gangs’ will be met with decisive forces, and held the LNA accountable for any damages to the port or oil facilities in Zeuitina. If war does break out between the PFG and the LNA at/near Zeuitina, impacts on the larger political process will be extremely negative, and attempts to renormalize oil exports via Jadhran are likely to collapse.

http://eyeonisisinlibya.com/the-anti-isis-coalition/anti-isis-8-aug-2016/

Forze speciali italiane in Libia. Nel Documento del Cofs le direttive ai corpi d'elite autorizzati direttamente da Renzi

10.08

Andrea Purgatori

Il governo italiano ammette per la prima volta ufficialmente che commando delle forze speciali siano stati dislocati nei teatri di guerra in Iraq, ma soprattutto in Libia. La notizia è contenuta in un documento appena trasmesso al Comitato di controllo sui servizi segreti (Copasir), e classificato “segreto”. Nel documento, redatto dal Cofs (Comando interforze per le Operazioni delle Forze Speciali), si specifica che si tratta di operazioni effettuate in applicazione della normativa approvata lo scorso novembre dal Parlamento, che consente al Presidente del Consiglio di autorizzare missioni all’estero di militari dei nostri corpi d’elite ponendoli sotto la catena di comando dei servizi segreti con tutte le garanzie connesse. Immunità compresa.

Dunque, è bene chiarire subito che in Libia tecnicamente non siamo ancora in guerra. Primo, perché i commando del 9° Reggimento "Col Moschin" del Gruppo Operativo Incursori del Comsubin, del 17° Stormo Incursori dell'Aeronautica Militare e del Gruppo di Intervento Speciale dei Carabinieri (e le forze di supporto aereo e navale) non rispondono alla catena di comando della coalizione dei trenta e più paesi cheappoggia il governo del premier Fayez al-Sarraj, ma direttamente al nostro esecutivo. Secondo, perché si tratterebbe di missioni limitate nel tempo, che partono dalle basi italiane. Ma almeno adesso non c’è più alcun dubbio sul fatto che nel supporto alle operazioni contro l’Isis non ci sia solo la mano delle forze speciali americane, britanniche e francesi. In Libia, a singhiozzo, ci siamo anche noi.

Cosa abbiamo fatto e cosa stiamo facendo in queste ore è scritto nero su bianco nell’informativa inviata al Copasir, su cui il Governo sarebbe pronto ad alzare il livello di segretezza fino ad apporre il sigillo del Segreto di Stato. Fonti della Difesa hanno confermato ufficiosamente il contenuto del documento, che dopo mesi di indiscrezioni e smentite – l’ultima con Matteo Renzi a Repubblica che diceva che "le strutture italiane impegnate nella lotta contro Daesh sono quelle autorizzate dal Parlamento, ai sensi della vigente normativa”, era in realtà un’ammissione della possibilità di applicare il testo della legge approvata a novembre – fa chiarezza sulla presenza delle nostre forze speciali in due teatri di guerra in rapidissima evoluzione.

http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2016/08/10/militari-italiani-libia_n_11422054.html

The Algerian Exception

29.05.2015

KAMEL DAOUD

Algeria is indeed a country of the Arab world: a de facto dictatorship with Islamists, oil, a vast desert, a few camels and soldiers, and women who suffer. But it also stands apart: It is the only Arab republic untouched by the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Amid the disasters routinely visited upon the region, Algeria is an exception. Immobile and invisible, it doesn’t change and keeps a low profile.

This is largely because Algeria already had its Arab Spring in 1988, and it has yet to recover. The experience left Algerians with a deep fear of instability, which the regime of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999, has exploited, along with the country’s oil wealth, to control its people — all the while deploying impressive ruses to hide Algeria from the world’s view.

October 1988: Thousands of young Algerians hit the streets to protest the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.), the dominant party born of the war for independence; the absence of presidential term limits; a mismanaged socialist economy; and a tyrannical secret service. The uprising is suppressed with bloodshed and torture. The single-party system nonetheless has to take a step back: Pluralism is introduced; reforms are announced.

The Islamists came out ahead in the first free elections in 1990, and again in the 1991 legislative elections — only to be foiled by the military in January 1992. Long before Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, Algeria had invented the concept of therapeutic coup d’état, of coup as cure for Islamism. At the time, the military’s intervention did not go over well, at least not with the West: This was before 9/11, and the world did not yet understand the Islamist threat. In Algeria, however, Islamism was already perceived as an unprecedented danger. After the coup followed a decade of civil war, which left as many as 200,000 people dead and a million displaced, not to mention all those who disappeared.

When in 2010-2011 the Arab Spring came to Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Algerians hoped for change, too. But their fear that war or the Islamists would return was greater still. “We have already paid,” the vox populi said, and the government joined in, intent on checking any revolutionary urge.

At the time I wrote: “Yes, we have already paid, but the goods have not been delivered.” The regime had slowly been gnawing away at the democratic gains made in October 1988: freedom of speech, a true multiparty system, free elections. Dictatorship had returned in the form of controlled democracy. And the government, though in the hands of a sickly and invisible president, was brilliant at playing on people’s fears. “Vote against change” was the gist of the prime minister’s campaign for the 2012 legislative elections.

The government also exploited the trauma left by France’s 132-year presence, casting the Arab Spring as a form of neocolonialism. To this day, the specter of colonialism remains the regime’s ideological foundation and the basis of its propaganda, and it allows the country’s so-called liberators — now well into their 70s — to still present themselves as its only possible leaders. France’s direct intervention to oust Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya only played into their hands; it looked like the sinister workings of their phantasmagorical triptych of enemies: France, the C.I.A. and Israel. Enough to quiet any populist ardor and charge the opposition’s leaders with being traitors and collaborators.

And so it was that as soon as January 2011 the early stirrings of protest were promptly quashed. The massive police apparatus played a part, as did state television, with stations taking turns reminding the people of a few chilling equations: democracy = chaos and stability = immobility.

Money also helped. Oil dollars may make the world go round, but they have kept Algeria still. In the contemporary mythology of the Arab Spring, Bouazizi the Tunisian is the unemployed man who topples a dictator by setting himself on fire in public. This hero could not have been Algerian: In this country, Mohamed Bouazizi would have been bought off, corrupted.

The Algerian regime is rich in oil and natural gas. And at the outset of the Arab revolts, it reached into its pockets, and gave out free housing, low-interest loans and huge bribes. Oil money was distributed not to revive the economy or create real jobs, but to quell anger and turn citizens into clients. Wilier than others, the government of Algeria did not kill people; it killed time.

While distributing handouts thwarted a revolution, it did trigger thousands of small local riots — 10,000 to 12,000 a year, by some estimates. But these protesters were not demanding democracy, just housing and roads, water and electricity. In 2011 a man set himself on fire in a town west of Algiers. Reporters flocked to him, thinking they had found a revolutionary. “I am no Bouazizi,” said the Algerian, from the hospital bed in which he would not die. “I just want decent housing.”

Meanwhile Mr. Bouteflika, ailing and absent, managed to get himself re-elected in 2014 without ever appearing in public, campaigning mostly by way of a Photoshopped portrait plastered across the country. The best dictatorship knows to stay invisible. Local journalists are under strict surveillance; the foreign media’s access is restricted; tourism is limited; few images of Algeria are broadcast internationally.

The only spectacle to come out of Algeria these last few years was of some Islamists taking hostages in the Tiguentourine gas field in January 2013. But the government, by responding firmly, was able to project the image of a regime that, though no ideological ally of the West, could nonetheless be counted on as a dependable partner in the global war against terrorism. To a Morsi, an Assad or a Sisi, Western governments prefer a Bouteflika, even aging and ailing and barely able to speak. Between antiterrorism and immobility, Algeria has succeeded in selling itself as a model even without being a democracy. No small feat.

But the situation is untenable. Politically, the Algerian regime has become the Pakistan of North Africa, with both money and power in the hands of a caste that the West thinks of as a difficult partner. Algeria is too vast a country to be run by a centralist government, and no new leaders have emerged who could ensure a guided transition. The Islamists are on the rise. Oil prices are dropping. The Algerian exception cannot last much longer.

Kamel Daoud, a journalist and columnist for Quotidien d’Oran, is the author of “The Meursault Investigation.” This essay was translated by Edward Gauvin from the French.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/the-algerian-exception.html?_r=1