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dijous, 25 d’agost del 2016

Militiaman who became Libya’s oil kingpin



Eastern militiaman’s support for the central government could end Eastern militiaman’s support for the central government could end the conflict.
By   
25.08
RA’S LANUF, Libya — Ibrahim Jadhran has gone from an alleged car thief imprisoned in Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s most notorious prison to a warlord in charge of a powerful militia sitting on billions of dollars of oil money.
Now he’s one of the most important players in an effort to end the chaos that has torn Libya apart since Qadhafi’s overthrow in 2011: He has thrown his weight behind the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), signing a breakthrough deal to reopen Libya’s oil ports.
Jadhran is the chief of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), a militia force of more than 20,000 men that is supposed to protect the country’s vital oil industry. Speaking in the large boardroom of his office complex in the deep-water port of Ra’s Lanuf, in the oil crescent of central Libya, he spelt out his supposed conversion.
“I am a Muslim but I consider myself a moderate,” said Jadhran, who had shed his normal military uniform for a dark suit. “And it is because of that I chose the middle … The area where we sit now is in the middle of Libya. It is my country’s security valve and it is the beating heart of Libya’s wealth.”
His voice matters both because of the men and the money he controls. Jadhran has been an extremely skillful player in the turmoil of post-Qadhafi Libya as militias, tribes and rival governments — an internationally recognized one in the eastern city of Tobruk, and a more Islamist one called the General National Congress (GNC) based in the capital Tripoli in the west — battled for control.
In mid-2013, Jadhran closed two major oil export terminals, demanding the GNC government give eastern Libya more autonomy, particularly over oil revenues, and branded the former management of the National Oil Company corrupt.
His brand of maverick separatism increased and, in March 2014, he allowed an oil tanker named the Morning Glory to set sail from the eastern port of Sidra under the North Korean flag. It was promptly stopped and boarded by the U.S. Navy.
Jadhran claims the Morning Glory crude oil shipment had been authorized by the Tobruk government, but the Tripoli government tried to stop the tanker, and the incident led to the ousting of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan.

Jadhran is also critical of the eastern legislature in Tobruk, which he claimed was seeking a military dictatorship under General Khalifa Haftar, who led an assault on the GNC government and remains a powerful warlord.

“We stood by the government, but at the time the National Congress started to lean toward the Islamists and then the parliament [House of Representatives in Tobruk] leaned towards the militarization of the state and the return of a dictatorship. So we saw that we were the only ones standing in the middle,” said Jadhran.
Jadhran supported a national political dialogue and it was this process that led to the December formation of the new U.N.-backed government in Tripoli. “We released a statement of support three hours after the GNA was formed despite the fact it was almost political suicide to support its newly-born presidential council,” he said.

Call to arms

Others point out that Jadhran’s loyalty to the GNA came at a price, the payment of his 20,000 plus PFG forces of all their back salaries.
Mattia Toaldo, policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, is critical of what he called Jadhran’s “opportunistic choices” but is pragmatic about his importance to Libya’s political future.
“Jadhran remains in the eyes of many Libyans a very controversial figure,” he said. “Yet, the truth is that along with Defence Minister Mahdi Al-Barghathi, he’s the only easterner who supported the GNA from day one and the GNA needs not just the oil he sits on but his loyalty.”
That support for a new and internationally recognized government, complete with a signing ceremony — attended by tribal leaders — to reopen the ports is something of a change for Jadhran. He’s been embroiled in his country’s violent politics since the war that ousted Qadhafi.
The son of an army officer, the muscular 34-year-old had spent the previous six years in the notorious Abu Slim prison, where he was sent at 22 for a life sentence for what he says was his political activism, but which records suggest was for car theft. HoweverQadhafi never called anyone a political prisoner and inmates were branded pretty thieves, traitors or spies.
“I was released three days after the spark of the February 17th revolution,” said Jadhran. “Because the demonstrators calling for change were met with live fire and mortars from the Qadhafi regime, peaceful protest was not possible and we were forced to take up arms. Young men found themselves forced to carry arms and return fire on an enemy.
He formed a battalion of volunteers to defend Libya’s oil crescent around Ra’s Lanuf and Ajdabiya, his hometown. “I managed to gather 16 battalions under the one flag, all of which participated in the revolution.”
In a deeply divided country, Jadhran defended Cyrenaica, the east of the country that has traditionally been hostile to the Tripoli-dominated west and slowly took over Libya’s oil infrastructure.
Now he controls the four main oil ports of Ra’s Lanuf, Zueitina, Sidra and Brega, many oil wells and hundreds of miles of pipelines and says that his goal is to protect the oil wealth that accounts for 97 percent of Libya’s economic output
His forces helped oust ISIL fighters from key oil terminals and in recent weeks have led assaults on key ISIL locations along Libya’s coast. He has also followed through on his promise to allow for renewed oil exports under a unified National Oil Company.
“The issue of selling and marketing oil is strictly the business of the National Oil Company, it has been entrusted to carry out this mission by the government and the people of Libya,” he said.
This week, the House of Representatives voted against the GNA in a no confidence motion. The vote means that Jadhran’s commitment to the GNA, together with his influence in the east and control over the security of oil exports, are even more vital to Libya’s future.
So the question is, what does Jadhran want? The answer seems to be political respectability and to present the PFG as an example of good governance to encourage investment back into Libya.
“There is no doubt that I have high expectations in assuming a high and honorable position and that this position should be for the good of the people,” said Jadhran. “If Libya becomes independent, its institutions secured within a real democratic and good governance blueprint, then this will enable international investment companies to re-enter Libya.”
 
8/25/16, 2:35 PM CET

dimarts, 16 d’agost del 2016

A New Conflict in the East? Jadhran, Haftar, and the Battles over Benghazi, Tripoli, and Sirte

15.08

Paradoxically, the moment of the GNA’s approach closer towards victory against IS in Sirte is also a moment of a key defeat in its legitimacy. The political process in Libya remains derailed, and the UN-mediated Government of National Accord continues to lose legitimacy despite the successes achieved against IS in Sirte in its name. This observation was recognised by the UN envoy Martin Kobler in a recent interview, saying that popular support for the GNA is crumbling with much of the early support for the GNA evaporating due to worsening economic and security woes. What Kobler didn’t mention is that it is largely his failed implemenation of Leon’s flawed plan which has gotten us towards this point.  Kobler has shown a German dogmatism for sticking towards the letter of the law of the LPA without understand that it was meant to bring Libya’s key power blocs on board which it has failed to do.
A War between the LNA and the PFG in Zeuitina remains a high risk as the LNA is trying to bleed away support from Jadhran and undermine GNA influence in the East.
Politically the GNA is unlikely to receive any significant boost in legitimacy or governance effectiveness until a total victory is achieved by Banyan Marsus-affiliated Misratan forces in Sirte. However, this may make or break the GNA, as pro- and anti-GNA factions (especially hard-line Islamists) begin to jostle already in the capital to position themselves to take advantage of the outcome.
After Sirte is declared liberated, serious rifts within GNA-affiliated militias are highly likely, between those supporting a full attack against Haftar, and those wishing to oust Islamist militias from Tripoli. Although it ought to be a boost for the GNA to liberate Sirte, it is likely that the victorious militias will defy GNA rulings and expose the fact that the GNA is not actually a unity of anything.

Sirte Could be Just the Beginning for ISIS in Africa

15.08

Libyan forces have been making significant advancements against ISIS in Sirte as a result of support from the US who have led an airstrike campaign that began earlier this month.
ISIS has since been desperate to establish a new base, and there are reports that ISIS fighters have been escaping Sirte and heading towards other African countries. There have also been reports that suggest ISIS fighters have been heading south of Sirte to other Libyan cities and towns.
ISIS militants are also said to have gone towards the Libyan border between Algeria and Niger which are known to lack security. Officials say all neighbouring countries are on high alert in hopes of stopping the extremist group from spreading further.
A Western official monitoring the events in Sirte said, “these borders are so huge and they require a degree of professionalism that these countries do not have in order to monitor them.”
Western sources say hundreds of ISIS fighter made their way south weeks ago when the group was cornered in the centre of Sirte.
Western officials monitoring the events in Sirte claimed that most of the fighters are foreign. Many of them are Tunisian but there is also a number of fighters from sub-Saharan African countries, especially Sudan and Nigeria.
Tunisia’s air force has been ordered to stay on high alert in response to the threat of ISIS spreading to their country, said a Tunisian military officer.
Last year, Tunisia started building a wall and water trenches along its border with Libya, meanwhile, Algeria also took precautions by building a fence along its border with Libya and adding security guards at the border.
The Libyan militia groups fighting against ISIS in Sirte could not stop the flow of people fleeing Sirte which made it easier for ISIS to flee, said a Libyan military intelligence officer.
“There was almost 100 miles between us and Islamic State [in Sirte]. All that space was open desert for them to escape,” said the intelligence officer.
Instead of fleeing from Libya, some ISIS fighters might decide to stay in the country to take advantage of the chaos and lack of security.
Bani Walid, a Libyan city located between Tripoli and Misrata in the country’s southern region, is said to be in a vulnerable state and might be ISIS’s next target.
“In Sirte they told us ‘the Islamic State fighters are our sons’ and asked that we not harm them. Bani Walid will say the same, but when they start chopping off their heads, they will come to us begging for help,” said the intelligence official.
With two governments in Libya declaring their authority over the country, Libya finds itself in the same weak state it was in two years ago. The Government of National Accord (GNA) is based in Tripoli and is backed by the UN and the international community, whereas, the House of Representatives (HoR) is based in Benghazi and is backed by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
Recently, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry called on all Libyan governments to unify and show their support to the Tripoli government.

Support for Libyan unity government 'crumbling': UN envoy

12.08

Martin Kobler warned that infrastructure problems, power outages and financial woes have eroded support for the Libyan unity government

Support for the UN-backed unity government in Libya is "crumbling" amid increased power outages and a weakening currency that is hitting crucial imports, the United Nations' envoy to the embattled north African country told a newspaper.
The Government of National Accord (GNA) has been struggling to impose its authority on a country riven by political and armed rivalries, posing extra challenges as it tries to quash Islamic State militants.
The UN point man for Libya, Martin Kobler, told Switzerland's Neue Zuercher Zeitung in an interview published on Friday there was no alternative to backing the GNA, but he acknowledged it had forfeited some of its initial popularity.
Asked about an earlier comment he made that 95 percent of Libyans backed GNA Prime Minister Fayez Seraj, he said: "That was in April. There was a lot of good will then for the unity government. It has lost some support in the meantime.
"At the time Tripoli had 20 hours of electricity a day, now it is 12 ... In April people had to pay 3.5 dinars for a dollar. Today it is five dinars. That is devastating for an import-oriented economy. Support is crumbling."
Kobler, a German career diplomat, said US air power could not win the fight against Islamic State in Libya, appealing for squabbling factions to support the GNA.
"Strikes by the Americans alone cannot defeat IS. The fight has to be a Libyan one. It will be won with ground troops," he said.

Blow to IS in Sirte

Pro-government forces battled on Thursday to clear IS from its main Libyan stronghold of Sirte, after dealing a major blow to the group by seizing their headquarters.
IS fighters still control several areas of the Mediterranean city, whose capture in June last year sparked fears that the group would use it as a springboard for attacks on Europe.
The fall of Sirte would be a huge setback to IS efforts to expand their self-proclaimed "caliphate" beyond Syria and Iraq where they have also suffered a string of losses.
Forces loyal to Libya's UN-backed unity government made a significant breakthrough on Wednesday in their nearly three-month-old offensive to retake the city, seizing a conference centre where IS had set up a base.
"The battle for Sirte has reached its final phase, after the successful offensive by our heroes," a spokesman for the forces, General Mohamad Ghassri, said on Thursday in remarks carried by the LANA news agency.
The rapid advance comes after the United States launched air strikes on IS positions in the city for the first time on 1 August.
IS took advantage of the chaos that followed the death of longtime Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 to gain a foothold in the country.
The forces loyal to the GNA on Wednesday also seized the University of Sirte campus just south of the Ouagadougou conference centre as well as the Ibn Sina Hospital to the north.
Libyan television stations broadcast images of flag-waving soldiers in recaptured areas including the Ouagadougou centre, flashing victory signs as they posed for photographs.
The pro-GNA forces said 16 of their fighters were killed and dozens wounded on Wednesday in the fighting in Sirte.
The GNA said that at least 20 militants had died in fighting for the university campus.
In total more than 300 pro-government fighters have been killed and 1,800 wounded in the operation for Sirte, according to medical sources in the city of Misrata, where the operation's command centre in based.

Kidnapped Egyptians freed

Twenty-three Egyptian workers kidnapped in Libya were freed and returned to their country on Friday, Egyptian state television reported.
One of the freed Egyptians told state television they had been kidnapped by people demanding ransom, in an interview at a border crossing between the neighbouring North African countries.
State television reported they were freed by "Libyan special forces in coordination with the Egyptian general intelligence service".
It aired footage of the workers arriving at the border crossing, waving Egyptian flags and prostrating themselves to God in gratitude.
They were kidnapped near the oil town of Brega and held hostage for 10 days, one of them said.
Thousands of Egyptians brave the unrest in Libya for employment despite government warnings to avoid the war-torn country.
In 2015, the Islamic State group's affiliate in Libya announced it had kidnapped and beheaded 21 Coptic Christians, most of them Egyptian.

The countdown of Haftar phenomenon

16.08

The militarily and politically events accelerated after the US President Barak Obama announced his decision earlier this month to support the Government of National Accord (GNA) militarily, through organized airstrikes against the Islamic State (IS) in the city of Sirte. Both political and military events have escalated.
The Arabic newspaper, Al-Quds Alaraby, said in its opinion, and LIBYAPROSPECT translates here, that in a report published by the Washington Post, a Libyan military source confirmed that the US intervention is not limited to air strikes, but also includes the presence of Special Operations troops “Commandos” providing on-the-ground support to the GNA.
In another occurrence, which is of great significance, Libyan military sources revealed that the French Special Forces supported the House of Representatives (HoR) Army, led by General Khalifa Haftar, withdrew from Benghazi a few days ago. Sources suggest that the troops are headed towards a US military base close to Malta. The French military presence was criticized heavily by the GNA and considered it a “blatant interference,” which resulted in the summoning of the French ambassador in Tripoli, who made an appearance after the death of three soldiers in a helicopter crash in Benghazi.
In a statement issued by six Western governments (US, France, Italy, UK, Germany, and Spain), the GNA has been called upon to take control of all power plants in Libya, which is the general opinion that the Libyan public is leaning towards, upon tensions, over which group is authorised to manage Al-Zwetina Oil Port, whether it is the government’s army or the oil installations’ guard. Haftar’s statements played a significant role in destabilizing the situation.
The US’s decision came after an extended period of hesitation. Reactions from western nations seem to be for the US’s raids on Sirte, especially after France’s ‘efforts’ in supporting the power-hungry Khalifa Haftar, an act that controverts entirely with the International Community’s (both Arab and Western) consent on the GNA.
The silence is dominating Haftar’s regional supporters, in particular, Egypt, was broken when Cairo announced their support to the US’s military raids on the Islamic State (IS) in Sirte. Regardless Cairo’s position being a formality or diplomatically motivated; it proves Cairo’s inability to defy the US’s western-backed decision.
Egypt’s ability to play the Haftar card to halt the return of a centralized Libyan government has weakened, due to the political, economic and social problems that Egypt is currently facing. Upon the Gulf’s decision to cut off their funding, Egypt finds itself in a position to seek aid from the International Monetary Fund regardless of the social and economic costs of this decision.
The only objection came from the Russian capital Moscow. However, this rejection can be reflected through the “Veto Weapon” in the UN’s Security Council, as was the case in regards to Yemen. Unfortunately, for the Russians, this will not delay the ongoing events in Libya, simply because they do not have the tools necessary on Libyan soil.
To be fair to the GNA, the seriousness of this government’s use of political and military resources to combat the IS, which cost them hundreds of casualties and injuries, at a time when Haftar was busy growing his publicity, had everything to do with the current evolving events.
The end of Haftar’s validity and his affiliates in some Arab countries will be a joyous occasion, a countdown to communities’ ability to reject extremism and to create genuine political compromises.

Libya’s Intelligence refutes Corriere della Sera’s claims that Italy paid €13m to free Italians from Sabratha

16.08
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The Head of the Libyan Intelligence Department in the capital, Tripoli, Mustafa Noah, has declined the allegations of the Italian corriere della sera newspaper that Italy ransomed the Italian hostages out of Libya with a sum worth 13 million euros.
“Libyan intelligence affirmed it was involved in a deal that saw Italian authorities paying ransom of 13 million euros to rescue the four Italian hostages out of Libya.” Corriere della sera wrote on Monday.
However, Noah refuted this report by the Italian newspaper and said in a press statement that saving the hostages was done by an intelligence operation in Libya.
Four Italian nationals who work in Milletah Oil and Gas Company were kidnapped by the IS militants back in 2015 nearby Sabratha city to the west of Tripoli. When freed by a security force from Sabratha in March 2016, two were alive and the other two were killed by IS terrorists.
It is worth mentioning that Sabratha city has seen violent clashes between the city’s security units and the IS militants who were positioned in secret cells in there. Those clashes – coupled with a US airstrike – helped eradicate them from the city and leave a huge number of them either dead or wounded.

Libyan intelligence chief denies Italy paid ransom to release Italian hostages in Libya

16.08

Head of Libya’s intelligence service Mustafa Nouh on Monday denied a media report from Italy’sCorriere della Sera newspaper earlier on Sunday claiming the Italian government had paid a ransom of 13 million euros to free two Italians abducted by Daesh in Libya.
Nouh described the report as “groundless” in a statement.
“The two hostages were freed as a result of a [security] operation,” he said.
Nouh praised the cooperation between the Italian intelligence and the general intelligence service in Tripoli, stressing that the continuation of this cooperation will have a positive impact on the fight against terrorism in Libya and Europe in general.
Militants affiliated with Daesh abducted four Italians last year near an oil and gas plant outside Libya’s north-western city of Sabratha, located some 50 miles west of Tripoli.
Two of the hostages were later freed by Libyan security forces, while the remaining two were killed by militants.

US airstrikes hit IS in Libya, marking 48 strikes in August

16.08

Airstrikes launched by the United States have hit an Islamic State group vehicle and four militant positions in Libya, raising to 48 the number of U.S. airstrikes against the extremist group since Washington launched its anti-IS campaign in Libya on Aug. 1.
In a statement Tuesday, U.S. Africa Command says it conducted the strikes in the coastal city of Sirte “at the request of, and in coordination with,” Libya’s United Nations-backed government.
Sirte is the Islamic State group’s last remaining stronghold in the country, and Libyan troops have been forcing the militants into ever-smaller bits of territory there, backed by the U.S. airstrikes.
The U.S. says the bombing campaign is critical to protecting U.S. national security interests, by denying IS a safe haven in Libya.

THE ANTI-ISIS COALITION

09.08

A shared military front has not materialized and is unlikely to materialize, because ISIS’s opponents have never made a coherent political coalition against it. At the time of writing (early August 2016), divisions between Haftar’s LNA, the GNA’s Banyan Marsus, and Ibrahim Jadhran’s Petroleum Facilities Gaurds have never been greater.
Conflict between the LNA and Jadhran’s PFG is imminent in the coming days and weeks, especially at Zeuitina. However, since 3 August, the LNA’s (153) Desert forces led by Col. Muftah Shagluf has been mobilising forces to positions in Al Shurb, 10 km east of Zeuitina port. The move has provoked a strong reaction from the PFG, whose spokesperson Ali Al-Hassi threatened that any attack by the LNA ‘gangs’ will be met with decisive forces, and held the LNA accountable for any damages to the port or oil facilities in Zeuitina. If war does break out between the PFG and the LNA at/near Zeuitina, impacts on the larger political process will be extremely negative, and attempts to renormalize oil exports via Jadhran are likely to collapse.

dimecres, 10 d’agost del 2016

Forze speciali italiane in Libia. Nel Documento del Cofs le direttive ai corpi d'elite autorizzati direttamente da Renzi

10.08

Andrea Purgatori

Il governo italiano ammette per la prima volta ufficialmente che commando delle forze speciali siano stati dislocati nei teatri di guerra in Iraq, ma soprattutto in Libia. La notizia è contenuta in un documento appena trasmesso al Comitato di controllo sui servizi segreti (Copasir), e classificato “segreto”. Nel documento, redatto dal Cofs (Comando interforze per le Operazioni delle Forze Speciali), si specifica che si tratta di operazioni effettuate in applicazione della normativa approvata lo scorso novembre dal Parlamento, che consente al Presidente del Consiglio di autorizzare missioni all’estero di militari dei nostri corpi d’elite ponendoli sotto la catena di comando dei servizi segreti con tutte le garanzie connesse. Immunità compresa.
Dunque, è bene chiarire subito che in Libia tecnicamente non siamo ancora in guerra. Primo, perché i commando del 9° Reggimento "Col Moschin" del Gruppo Operativo Incursori del Comsubin, del 17° Stormo Incursori dell'Aeronautica Militare e del Gruppo di Intervento Speciale dei Carabinieri (e le forze di supporto aereo e navale) non rispondono alla catena di comando della coalizione dei trenta e più paesi cheappoggia il governo del premier Fayez al-Sarraj, ma direttamente al nostro esecutivo. Secondo, perché si tratterebbe di missioni limitate nel tempo, che partono dalle basi italiane. Ma almeno adesso non c’è più alcun dubbio sul fatto che nel supporto alle operazioni contro l’Isis non ci sia solo la mano delle forze speciali americane, britanniche e francesi. In Libia, a singhiozzo, ci siamo anche noi.
Cosa abbiamo fatto e cosa stiamo facendo in queste ore è scritto nero su bianco nell’informativa inviata al Copasir, su cui il Governo sarebbe pronto ad alzare il livello di segretezza fino ad apporre il sigillo del Segreto di Stato. Fonti della Difesa hanno confermato ufficiosamente il contenuto del documento, che dopo mesi di indiscrezioni e smentite – l’ultima con Matteo Renzi a Repubblica che diceva che "le strutture italiane impegnate nella lotta contro Daesh sono quelle autorizzate dal Parlamento, ai sensi della vigente normativa”, era in realtà un’ammissione della possibilità di applicare il testo della legge approvata a novembre – fa chiarezza sulla presenza delle nostre forze speciali in due teatri di guerra in rapidissima evoluzione.

dimarts, 9 d’agost del 2016

The Algerian Exception

29.05.2015

KAMEL DAOUD

Algeria is indeed a country of the Arab world: a de facto dictatorship with Islamists, oil, a vast desert, a few camels and soldiers, and women who suffer. But it also stands apart: It is the only Arab republic untouched by the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Amid the disasters routinely visited upon the region, Algeria is an exception. Immobile and invisible, it doesn’t change and keeps a low profile.

This is largely because Algeria already had its Arab Spring in 1988, and it has yet to recover. The experience left Algerians with a deep fear of instability, which the regime of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999, has exploited, along with the country’s oil wealth, to control its people — all the while deploying impressive ruses to hide Algeria from the world’s view.

October 1988: Thousands of young Algerians hit the streets to protest the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.), the dominant party born of the war for independence; the absence of presidential term limits; a mismanaged socialist economy; and a tyrannical secret service. The uprising is suppressed with bloodshed and torture. The single-party system nonetheless has to take a step back: Pluralism is introduced; reforms are announced.

The Islamists came out ahead in the first free elections in 1990, and again in the 1991 legislative elections — only to be foiled by the military in January 1992. Long before Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, Algeria had invented the concept of therapeutic coup d’état, of coup as cure for Islamism. At the time, the military’s intervention did not go over well, at least not with the West: This was before 9/11, and the world did not yet understand the Islamist threat. In Algeria, however, Islamism was already perceived as an unprecedented danger. After the coup followed a decade of civil war, which left as many as 200,000 people dead and a million displaced, not to mention all those who disappeared.

When in 2010-2011 the Arab Spring came to Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Algerians hoped for change, too. But their fear that war or the Islamists would return was greater still. “We have already paid,” the vox populi said, and the government joined in, intent on checking any revolutionary urge.

At the time I wrote: “Yes, we have already paid, but the goods have not been delivered.” The regime had slowly been gnawing away at the democratic gains made in October 1988: freedom of speech, a true multiparty system, free elections. Dictatorship had returned in the form of controlled democracy. And the government, though in the hands of a sickly and invisible president, was brilliant at playing on people’s fears. “Vote against change” was the gist of the prime minister’s campaign for the 2012 legislative elections.

The government also exploited the trauma left by France’s 132-year presence, casting the Arab Spring as a form of neocolonialism. To this day, the specter of colonialism remains the regime’s ideological foundation and the basis of its propaganda, and it allows the country’s so-called liberators — now well into their 70s — to still present themselves as its only possible leaders. France’s direct intervention to oust Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya only played into their hands; it looked like the sinister workings of their phantasmagorical triptych of enemies: France, the C.I.A. and Israel. Enough to quiet any populist ardor and charge the opposition’s leaders with being traitors and collaborators.

And so it was that as soon as January 2011 the early stirrings of protest were promptly quashed. The massive police apparatus played a part, as did state television, with stations taking turns reminding the people of a few chilling equations: democracy = chaos and stability = immobility.

Money also helped. Oil dollars may make the world go round, but they have kept Algeria still. In the contemporary mythology of the Arab Spring, Bouazizi the Tunisian is the unemployed man who topples a dictator by setting himself on fire in public. This hero could not have been Algerian: In this country, Mohamed Bouazizi would have been bought off, corrupted.

The Algerian regime is rich in oil and natural gas. And at the outset of the Arab revolts, it reached into its pockets, and gave out free housing, low-interest loans and huge bribes. Oil money was distributed not to revive the economy or create real jobs, but to quell anger and turn citizens into clients. Wilier than others, the government of Algeria did not kill people; it killed time.

While distributing handouts thwarted a revolution, it did trigger thousands of small local riots — 10,000 to 12,000 a year, by some estimates. But these protesters were not demanding democracy, just housing and roads, water and electricity. In 2011 a man set himself on fire in a town west of Algiers. Reporters flocked to him, thinking they had found a revolutionary. “I am no Bouazizi,” said the Algerian, from the hospital bed in which he would not die. “I just want decent housing.”

Meanwhile Mr. Bouteflika, ailing and absent, managed to get himself re-elected in 2014 without ever appearing in public, campaigning mostly by way of a Photoshopped portrait plastered across the country. The best dictatorship knows to stay invisible. Local journalists are under strict surveillance; the foreign media’s access is restricted; tourism is limited; few images of Algeria are broadcast internationally.

The only spectacle to come out of Algeria these last few years was of some Islamists taking hostages in the Tiguentourine gas field in January 2013. But the government, by responding firmly, was able to project the image of a regime that, though no ideological ally of the West, could nonetheless be counted on as a dependable partner in the global war against terrorism. To a Morsi, an Assad or a Sisi, Western governments prefer a Bouteflika, even aging and ailing and barely able to speak. Between antiterrorism and immobility, Algeria has succeeded in selling itself as a model even without being a democracy. No small feat.

But the situation is untenable. Politically, the Algerian regime has become the Pakistan of North Africa, with both money and power in the hands of a caste that the West thinks of as a difficult partner. Algeria is too vast a country to be run by a centralist government, and no new leaders have emerged who could ensure a guided transition. The Islamists are on the rise. Oil prices are dropping. The Algerian exception cannot last much longer.

Kamel Daoud, a journalist and columnist for Quotidien d’Oran, is the author of “The Meursault Investigation.” This essay was translated by Edward Gauvin from the French.

dissabte, 6 d’agost del 2016

VARVELLI (ISPI): I RAID USA NON BASTANO A SCONFIGGERE L’IS

03.08

I raid aerei condotti dagli Usa su Sirte, roccaforte libica del sedicente Stato islamico (Is), “nel breve periodo rafforzano il governo” di concordia nazionale guidato da Fayez al-Sarraj, ma non sono sufficienti per estirpare l’organizzazione jihadista dal Paese nordafricano. Lo afferma ad Aki Adnkronos International Arturo Varvelli, (nella foto a sinistra) esperto di Libia e responsabile dell’Osservatorio terrorismo dell’Ispi.
Innanzitutto, sottolinea l’esperto, “non si possono paragonare questi bombardamenti a quelli su Siria e Iraq anche perché il coinvolgimento degli Stati Uniti è stato molto selettivo. Non è una novità nemmeno i bombardamenti (in Libia, ndr) perché ce ne erano stati a dicembre scorso e uno a febbraio, durante il quale era stata colpita una base a Sabratha dove c’erano tunisini legati allo Stato islamico”.
La scelta degli Stati Uniti di bombardare i jihadisti a Sirte in questo momento, spiega Varvelli, arriva sostanzialmente per due motivi.
Il primo è che Washington vuole cercare di superare lo stallo che si è verificato a Sirte, dove i misuratini, sebbene abbiano costretto l’Is ad asserragliarsi in pochi quartieri, non riescono a prendere il controllo totale della città. “Gli Stati Uniti cercano di contribuire al lavoro che sul campo stanno facendo i misuratini.
La strategia può essere cambiata perché ora, rispetto ad alcuni mesi fa, c’è chiaramente un fronte aperto dalle forze pro-Sarraj”, afferma Varvelli.
Il secondo punto è che ora c’è una maggiore chiarezza politica, con un governo, “seppur fragile e non pienamente legittimo”, comunque riconosciuto a livello internazionale.
“Sarraj stesso ha richiesto l’intervento perché si sentiva in questo momento molto debole, accusato dai misuratini e dalle componenti della Tripolitania che stanno combattendo al fronte di non farsi mai vivo e di non essere riuscito ad ottenere un supporto vero e proprio dalla comunità internazionale nella battaglia che stanno facendo sostanzialmente da soli”, aggiunge Varvelli.
“Quindi Sarraj ha risposto a queste accuse e gli Stati Uniti a loro volta in questa maniera lo rafforzano nel breve periodo dandogli una credibilità.
Ma a lungo andare, se l’impasse militare non dovesse essere superata, il governo Sarraj resterà sempre esposto alle accuse di essere un fantoccio dell’Occidente”.
I raid Usa, inoltre, sono per Varvelli anche un messaggio “indiretto” al generale Khalifa Haftar, che guida le forze fedeli alle autorità di Tobruk, e al suo “protettore che sta al Cairo”, ovvero il presidente egiziano Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
“In questo periodo Haftar sembra uscire un po’ come il perdente in quanto non può rivendicare un vero e proprio ruolo nella battaglia contro lo Stato islamico – afferma l’esperto – ma in realtà continua a controllare gran parte del territorio della Cirenaica e ad essere usato da al-Sisi stesso come baluardo contro l’espansione del Califfato”.
“Da ciò arriva tutta una serie di equivoci nella comunità internazionale che è ancora divisa e non trova una soluzione politica comune.
Penso che debba essere trovato un comune denominatore, ma quale sia la formula politica è molto difficile da stabilire”, sottolinea Varvelli.
L’analista dell’Ispi si mostra dubbioso sull’efficacia dei raid aerei nella lotta contro l’Is. “Se guardiamo a quanto avviene in Iraq e Siria possiamo dire che non sono decisivi e non sono sufficienti.
E’ anche vero che in Libia lo Stato islamico è stato poco contrastato da questo punto di vista. Quindi nel breve periodo qualche risultato potrebbero ottenerlo, poi è molto difficile pensare che i jihadisti dell’Is vengano sconfitti solo con i bombardamenti aerei”.
Infine Varvelli analizza il rischio che i raid in Libia possano esporre maggiormente l’Italia alla minaccia terroristica. “L’Italia non è immune dai rischi rispetto all’Europa.
Certamente Francia e Belgio non sono l’Italia per numero di possibili casi di radicalizzazione e per contesto socio-politico. Sappiamo comunque che l’Italia non sarebbe immune al terrorismo e i raid su Sirte cambiano poco”.

LA STRANA VOGLIA DI RENZI DI DARE LE BASI PER LA GUERRA IN LIBIA

06.08

Gianandrea Gaiani

Washington non ha chiesto ancora supporto all’Italia per le operazioni che conduce da alcuni giorni in Libia, la mini-guerra di Barack Obama contro lo Stato Islamico a Sirte impiegando pochi aerei, droni ed elicotteri basati sulla portaelicotteri Wasp e in Giordania.
Eppure a Roma il governo sembra avere una gran fretta di accodarsi alla campagna aerea americana, se non mettendo in campo mezzi militari almeno fornendo le basi ai velivoli statunitensi.
Soprattutto ai droni armati Reaper a cui proprio il governo Renzi aveva imposto che non fossero impiegati sulla Libia in missioni di attacco appena pochi mesi or sono, quando venne rinegoziato l’impiego elle basi americane in Italia.
Invece mercoledì il ministro della Difesa, Roberta Pinotti, ha detto che il governo è pronto a “considerare positivamente un eventuale utilizzo delle basi e degli spazi aerei nazionali a supporto delle operazioni, dovesse tale evenienza essere ritenuta funzionale a una più efficace e rapida conclusione dell’azione in corso in Libia”.
Cioè siamo pronti dare le nostre basi se questo consentirà agli USA di colpire meglio e più rapidamente l’IS. A illustrare in Parlamento la nuova posizione del governo sono andati invece due sottosegretari, Domenico Rossi per la Difesa e Vincenzo Amendola per la Farnesina.
Ci auguriamo” che l”intervento americano in Libia contro l”Isis “sia risolutivo”. “Un messaggio molto forte per la lotta al terrorismo” oltre che un aiuto “per la stabilizzazione” ha detto Amendola ribadendo quanto già affermato dal ministro Paolo Gentiloni.
Le operazioni aeree americane condotte fino ad ora, ha precisato Rossi, “non hanno interessato in alcun modo l’Italia ma il nostro Paese non resta indifferente” e “mantiene aperta una linea di dialogo diretta sia con la controparte libica sia con gli alleati americani per verificare lo sviluppo dell”operazione e le eventuali esigenze di supporto indiretto”.
Il governo “è pronto a considerare positivamente un eventuale utilizzo delle basi e degli spazi aerei nazionali a supporto dell”operazione, dovesse tale evenienza essere ritenuta funzionale a una più efficace e rapida conclusione dell”azione in corso”.
Le opposizioni erano infuriate per l’assenza dei ministri dall’aula che qualcuno ha interpretato con la volontà di non “metterci la faccia” nel momento in cui l’Italia preme per entrare in guerra, anche se senza combatterla con sue truppe e mezzi.
Eppure la mozione di sostegno alla linea del governo ha avuto 225 voti a favore e 82 contrari.
Del resto già nell’estate 2014, quando Roma aderì alla Coalizione contro l’Isis, Arturo Parisi, ex ministro della Difesa del PD, mise in guardia che l’adesione alla Coalizione, anche se con aerei disarmati e con forniture di armi e consiglieri militari ai curdi, rendeva l’Italia belligerante con tutti i rischi e le conseguenze del caso.
Un rischio molto più concreto ora anche se finora l’Italia è stata risparmiata dall’offensiva terroristica proprio in virtù della sua “finta” guerra al Califfato, limitata a istruttori per i curdi e aerei e droni disarmati n volo sull’Iraq.
Difficile quindi comprendere la fretta di Roma di schierarsi con gli USA in un intervento militare troppo limitato per essere risolutivo e che rischia di destabilizzare il governo di Fayez al-Sarraj invece di consolidarlo.
Se in questo modo il governo Renzi cerca protagonismo può anche rassegnarsi: l’intervento di Washington richiesto dal governo di Tripoli ha definitivamente messo l’Europa e l’Italia ai margini della crisi libica con un ruolo del tutto irrilevante.
Il generale Mohamed al Ghasri, portavoce delle forze governative che partecipano all’operazione militare per la liberazione di Sirte ha espresso il favore per l’iniziativa italiana.
“Siamo favorevoli all’uso delle basi aerei italiane e saremmo molto felici se Roma prendesse una decisione in tal senso e le mettesse a disposizione nell’azione degli Usa contro Daesh a Sirte”.
Ciò detto è però quasi ridicolo che Roma offra, con il sostegno libico, basi che Washington non ha ancora chiesto.
Quello che occorrerebbe dire chiaramente, meglio se a farlo fossero premier e ministri invece di sottosegretari, è che il passo avanti dell’Italia non sarà a costo zero.
Anzi, pare certo che anche l’Italia pagherà il ruolo bellico più deciso subendo quelle azioni terroristiche che non hanno risparmiato molte Nazioni coinvolte in prima linea nella guerra all’Isis.
Ovviamente mi auguro di sbagliare e che abbiamo ragione quanti sostengono che il rischio di azioni terroristiche in Italia non è legato al nostro eventuale ruolo bellico.
Temo però che non sia così. Questo non significa necessariamente che Roma debba rinunciare a combattere l’Isis per evitare azioni terroristiche sul territorio nazionale, sarebbe però opportuno che il governo dicesse chiaramente quali decisioni ha assunto e quali rischi ha deciso di correre.
Una simile esposizione varrebbe forse la pena accettarla in caso di intervento diretto delle truppe e dei velivoli italiani contro lo Stato Islamico e non solo perché consentiamo l’uso delle nostre basi agli statunitensi per un’operazione di breve durata (30 giorni) e bassissima intensità (5 raid al giorno) che molti analisti considerano troppo blanda per risultare risolutiva.